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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies the effects of credit availability on firm-level outcomes
using a new matched employer-employee panel of Chilean firms that also includes
firm-bank lending and tax data.
In Chapter I, using a natural experiment and a differences in differences approach,
I show that firms that experienced a positive credit supply shock during the 2008-
09 recession in Chile, exhibit higher labor productivity four years after the shock,
even after aggregate demand and credit supply have fully recovered. Chapter II
presents evidence consistent with the hypothesis that at least part of the productivity
improvement is due to an increased ability of firms with access to credit to adjust
labor during the recession. In particular, I find that these firms exhibit larger worker
flows and use credit to adjust employment by churning more workers.
Chapter III studies a government partial credit guarantee scheme for bank loans to
small and medium sized enterprises using a regression discontinuity design around the
threshold for eligibility. I show that the program has a large positive causal effect on
firms’ total borrowing, and the effect is persistent. Moreover, firms that obtain bank
loans through this scheme can borrow more from loans not insured by the guarantee,
v
which means that the program has a positive effect on the firms’s total borrowing
capacity. Finally, the program also helps in the formation of new bank-firm lending
relationships.
vi
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1Chapter 1
The Medium Term Effects of Credit
Availability During Recessions
1.1 Introduction
The Great Recession in the US brought renewed attention to the role of credit during
downturns. A number of influential studies have tried to assess the link between
credit supply shocks and employment. However due to data limitations, the empirical
literature has so far been unable to examine the medium-term consequences of credit
supply shocks on employment and labor productivity, and understand the extent
to which firms are constrained in their ability to finance labor adjustment costs in
recessions.
The first chapter of this dissertation tries to fill that gap by providing new evidence
on the link between bank lending and employment. I use a natural experiment in Chile
and a new data set that includes matched employer-employee and firm-bank lending
relationships for the census of firms in Chile. I first establish that firms less affected by
a negative credit supply shock have higher employment levels, confirming the results in
Chodorow-Reich (2014). In the medium term employment and credit effects dissipate
but the effect on labor productivity does not, showing that a temporary credit supply
shock during the recession has persistent effects on labor productivity at the firm
level.
A new strand of the literature studies the link between bank lending and real out-
2comes at the firm level.1 Chodorow-Reich (2014) using data on firms in the syndicated
loan market in the US shows that contractions in lending by banks more exposed to
the financial crisis have negative employment effects at the firm level. He finds that
credit supply shocks by troubled banks could explain between one and two thirds
of the total fall in employment in his sample. Using an external shock to Japanese
banks Gan (2007) finds that negative credit supply shocks reduce capital investment
at the firm level. In the trade literature Amiti & Weinstein (2011) and Paravisini
et al. (2015) find that the reduction of trade credit due to bank lending shocks has a
negative impact on a firm’s exports.
Closely related to the empirical approach in these papers, I use the capitalization
of a major bank in Chile as part of the Chilean government’s efforts to support private
lending during the 2008-09 recession to identify the credit supply shock at the firm
level. The richness and detail of the Chilean banking and employment data allows
me to study new outcomes such as sales, employment flows and labor productivity
- measured as sales per worker. I use a difference in difference design to compare
outcomes for firms that had the capitalized bank as their main lender before the
capital injection, with those of firms that did not. The approach takes advantage of
the stickiness in bank lending relationships shown in Petersen & Rajan (1994) and
Chodorow-Reich (2014). The identification assumption required to recover the causal
effects of the credit supply shock is that outcomes at both groups of firms would follow
the same trend in absence of the capital injection - i.e. a parallel trends assumption. A
potential concern for the identification strategy is that, due to non-random firm-bank
matching, firms in the treatment and control groups might respond differently to the
business cycle in ways not captured by time-varying observed firm characteristics.
I evaluate the plausibility of the identification assumption in several ways. I
1There is also an extensive previous literature on the lending channel that shows how shocks to
bank health affect lending at the firm level. Some of these studies include Kashyap & Stein (2000),
Khwaja & Mian (2008) and Paravisini (2008).
3start by showing that treatment and control groups react similarly to macro shocks
happening before the policy change. In fact, there is no evidence of differential trends
in the pre-shock period when the adverse aggregate shock had already hit the Chilean
economy in 2008. This is unsurprising because the capitalized bank is large and has a
well diversified portfolio across firms of different sizes in all economic sectors, making
it likely to have a client base that is fairly representative of the firm population. In
terms of observable characteristics however, the capitalized bank has a larger fraction
of small and medium size firms. Previous studies like Gertler & Gilchrist (1994) have
shown that small firms are more sensitive to the business cycle than large firms. Also,
Moscarini & Postel-Vinay (2012) find that small firms in the US hoard more labor
during recessions. Thus the larger fraction of small firms in the treatment group (that
is, firms whose main bank was the capitalized bank) could bias the estimated average
coefficients. I show that this is unlikely by estimating the heterogeneous impact on
bank debt at firms of different size and age. Except for the small number of large firms
that have alternatives sources of external funding, the impact is similar across other
size categories. Also, the evidence is consistent with Fort et al. (2013) who emphasize
that age rather than size is correlated with the degree of informational frictions that
a firm faces when borrowing from a bank. In the sample both groups are similar in
terms of firm age, which makes explanations based on differential sensitivities to the
business cycle hard to sustain. Finally, I argue that because firms in the treatment
group are relatively more sensitive to the negative aggregate shock and they receive a
positive credit supply shock, both shocks are negatively correlated and therefore any
potential bias would work against finding an effect. Thus, in presence of any bias,
the estimates provide a lower bound for the effect of credit supply shocks.
The analysis proceeds in several steps. I first recover the credit supply shock
at the firm level, defined as the effect on the firm’s total bank debt of having the
4capitalized bank as the main lender instead of another bank. On average, bank debt
at treated firms fell 25 percentage points less than that of control firms during 2009.
This result is robust to a variety of specifications and is explained mainly by the sharp
contraction in lending by banks other than the capitalized bank.
I then move to short term real effects and find results in line with those reported
in the literature. On average, employment at treated firms falls 2.1 percentage points
less during 2009. In the sample, this means that treated firm employment fell one
third less than that of control firms. Results for other real variables illustrate why
credit matters during recessions: sales and pre-tax profits fall 6 percentage points less
in treated firms, around one fourth and two thirds of the fall observed in controls,
respectively. The effect on labor productivity is 4 percentage points.
In order to evaluate medium term outcomes, I first examine the path of differ-
ential effects over time. One year after the shock (2010), differential credit effects
quickly dissipate, while employment, sales and productivity differential effects peak,
with estimates of 5 percentage points, 14 percentage points and 8 percentage points
respectively. Four years after the shock, credit and employment level effects dissipate.
Sales however, remain significantly higher for treated firms, which in turn means the
differential effect in sales per worker is also significant and positive: 6.4 percentage
points. Given that the medium term differential effect in sales is not explained by a
differential effect in employment, how much is attributable to differences in capital,
and how much to total factor productivity remains an open question. Unfortunately, I
do not observe a precise measure of capital or investment, so I cannot directly answer
this question. However, I can look at labor adjustment at the firm level on a number
of different dimensions and assess one particular mechanism that would partially ex-
plain medium term labor productivity effects. This what I do in the second chapter
of this dissertation.
51.2 Institutional Framework
1.2.1 The 2008-09 Crisis in Chile
Chile is among the most open economies in the world. As such, during 2008-2009
Chile experienced one of the worst downturns in decades with a 1.5% contraction in
GDP in 2009.2 Chile’s main export is copper, which represents approximately 20%
of GDP and 60% of the country’s total exports. Its dependence on copper and high
degree of openness make the country vulnerable to external shocks, such as changes
in global demand and commodity prices. Figures 1·1 and 1·2 show the evolution of
prices and value of mining exports and total exports. The sharp decline in export
prices is visible from the second quarter of 2008 and becomes particularly intense
from the second semester, following the global decline in the price of commodities.
Between the second quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 exports fell 41% ,
approximately 4% of Chile’s GDP in 2008. The sharp decline in exports was followed
by a halt and later contraction in domestic demand, GDP and investment, starting
the last quarter of 2008, as shown in figures 1·3 and 1·4. The labor market lagged in
the response to the adverse shock. Employment started to fall from the first quarter
of 2009, while the unemployment rate rose from 7.5% in December 2008 to a peak of
10.8% in July 2009, as shown in figures 1·5 and 1·6.
Chile’s banking system is large relative to the corporate debt market and most
firms depend on it for external funding.3 In 2008 total private bank lending was
around 80% of GDP while domestic outstanding private debt in the form of corpo-
rate bonds or commercial papers was approximately 15% of GDP.4 Even though the
financial system in Chile weathered the crisis well, bank lending ground to a halt
2I provide a short description of the recession in Chile. De Gregorio (2009) provides a detailed
account of the impact of the global crisis in Chile.
3See Sirtaine (2006) for details.
4For comparison the average for OECD countries in 2007 was around 90% for bank lending and
around 70% for corporate private debt.
6after October 2008 and started contracting from 2009 as, according to the Central
Bank of Chile, banks hoarded liquidity and significantly tightened lending conditions
fearing a sudden stop in external financing.5 Commercial lending fell 5.9% during
2009. Although the contraction in lending had an important supply component, it
also reflected changes in demand for bank credit. In addition to the decline in ag-
gregate demand, large firms with access to the capital market changed their debt
composition by issuing bonds in the local market.
The Chilean Government reacted quickly after the fall of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008 as the crises of 1982 and 1998 had shown the disastrous consequences
of financial crises in the economy. In addition to a special fiscal stimulus package
equivalent to 2.8% of GDP, in December 2008 the government announced several
measures to support private lending in the economy. The most important measure
in the package was the capitalization of the only state-owned bank in Chile, Banco
Estado (BECH).
1.2.2 Policy Change
The capitalization was announced in December 2008 and implemented in March 2009.
The announcement allowed the bank to sustain lending in the first months of 2009.
Importantly, it was aimed specifically to support lending in the economy and not to
help BECH, as the bank was not in distress, with a capital adequacy ratio of 10.8
at the moment, well above the minimum required by law. The government injected
500 million dollars of fresh funds, equivalent to a 36% increase in BECH’s equity.
Considering that the bank could leverage approximately up to ten times the amount
of the capitalization, it implied a potential injection of five billion dollars in new
loans, around 3.6% of total bank debt in the economy. By the end of 2009, BECH
had increased lending by 4.3 billion dollars, approximately a 22% increase in its loan
5See Cowan & Marfan (2009) and OECD’s review of the Chilean financial system (2011).
7portfolio. During the twelve months period after the announcement BECH increased
commercial lending by 24%. Other banks in the system decreased commercial lending
by 13% on average in the same period. Figures 1·7 and 1·8 show commercial lending
by BECH and the rest of the bank system.6 Thus BECH used the new funds to
increase loans by a significant amount in a short period of time, lending out most of
the new resources instead of hoarding liquidity.7
At the moment of the capitalization BECH was the third largest bank in the
economy with a 10% share in commercial loans before the crisis. BECH’ share went
up by 13% by the end of 2009. It has the largest base of depositors in the banking
system, with an 18% share of total deposits and operates across all regions in the
country.8 Although it is the only state-owned bank in Chile, it is autonomous from the
government and subject to the same regulation as its competitors. In Governmental
support for the bank is not explicit, but it is assumed by the market, therefore its
debt ratings reflect those of the Chilean Government, which shows that BECH is
perceived as a sound financial institution.9
There are two additional features of BECH that are important to note. First,
although the bank has a well diversified loan portfolio across economic sectors and
business segments, it has the largest market share in total loans for small and medium
enterprises (SMEs). The larger fraction of SMEs is likely due to one of the bank’s
objectives, which is to facilitate access to banking products. Importantly, the larger
fraction of SMEs does not increase the risk of the bank’s loan portfolio relative to
other banks. In fact the fraction of non performing loans for BECH clients is not
6Data source is the Central Bank of Chile, available at www.bcentral.cl
7Berrospide (2013) illustrates the case of commercial banks in the US with enough liquidity that
still reduce lending for a precautionary motive.
8Rating reports from Standard and Poors, Fitch Ratings and Moody’s provide a detailed descrip-
tion of the bank and its policies. Banco Estado Memory 2009 (in spanish) provides a detailed account
of the bank’s lending behavior during the crisis. Available at www.corporativo.bancoestado.cl.
9In December 2008 the Chilean Government’s international long term debt had an A+ rating
according to Standard and Poors.
8different from that of the rest of the banking system on average, as shown later in
the next section.10
Second, the bank has behaved in a countercyclical way before, that is, lending
relatively more than other banks during downturns and relatively less during expan-
sions. In particular, before the 2008-09 crisis, the bank’s countercyclical policy can
be better seen during the expansion between 1993-97 and the Asian Crisis in 1998-99,
as shown by Figure 1·9. Importantly, the government had never capitalized the bank
before, so the capitalization as a policy instrument was unexpected until the moment
of the announcement in December 2008. I will discuss later how these features may
affect my empirical strategy.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
1.3.1 Data
This dissertation uses a new data set that links employment, banking and tax infor-
mation for the universe of Chilean firms. The data are collected from administrative
records from Chile’s Internal Revenue Service, the Unemployment Insurance Admin-
istrator and Chile’s Bank Supervisor. These institutions use the information for their
own auditing or supervising activities, which means that this is high quality data.
Data sets are merged using the “Rol U´nico Tributario” and the “Rol U´nico Na-
cional”, a unique identifier for corporations and individuals, respectively. The panel
covers from 2007 to 2012.
Tax record information from Chile’s IRS has annual frequency and comes from the
F22 form, which contains income tax declarations by corporations and individuals.11
This information is used to construct variables on firm characteristics such as annual
10The special objective of facilitating access to banking products - consistent with the social role
of the bank - has costs in terms of the bank’s efficiency. The return on average equity (before taxes)
for BECH is around 16% while for the rest of the banks in Chile it is around 20%.
11Available (in spanish) at www.sii.cl.
9sales, age, economic sector and profits before taxes.
Employment information comes from different tables of the Unemployment In-
surance data base.12 Unemployment insurance contributions are mandatory for all
salaried workers in the private sector in Chile, therefore the information covers the
universe of employer-employee matches for salaried jobs in the formal private sector.13
The data has monthly frequency which allows the construction of in and out flows at
that frequency. Worker information includes the wage, tenure on the firm and type
of contract.
An important feature of the Chilean labor market I make use of in this dissertation
is the existence of two types of contracts: short term or temporary, and long term or
indefinite contracts. The main difference between the two is that short term contracts
do not accrue severance payments to the firm. When firing a worker in a long term
contract with a tenure of more than one year, the firm is required to pay the worker
at least one month of pay for each year of tenure, with a maximum of eleven months
of pay. A worker cannot be on a temporary contract with the same firm for more than
one year.14 Short term contracts are used by firms for different reasons. Sectors like
construction and agriculture employ a larger fraction of their workers on temporary
contracts due to the seasonal and temporal characteristics of their businesses, as
shown in Table 1.1. Another important use of short term contracts is training and
trial purposes. Given that a firm wants to fill a long term vacancy and needs to learn
about the match quality, it is almost always preferable to offer a short term contract
to the candidate. Long term contracts are associated with skilled workers and high-
12The detailed content of each table is available (in spanish) at www.safp.cl.
13A comparison of the aggregate employment information with that on the National Employment
Survey of the National Institute of Statistics shows that the Unemployment Insurance represents
approximately 90% of total dependent employment in the private sector, therefore the coverage of
the data base of overall private employment is large.
14After a year, independent of what is written in the employment contract, it is assumed that the
worker was on a long term contract from the beginning.
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quality matches. On average, during 2008, 46% of hires in long term contracts in
the sample come from a short term contract in the same firm. Furthermore, when
transferring from a short term to a long term contract within the firm, workers get
on average an immediate 17% increase in the real wage.15
Banking data includes the universe of bank-firm pairs and comes from the “Debtors
System” of the Chilean Banks Superintendency.16 All banks are required to send the
same information to the Supervisor with monthly frequency. Characteristics of the
loans like the interest rate or maturity are not available. The information on the
amount of debt for each bank-firm pair is divided in several categories depending on
the type of the loan and the time since the amount was declared non-performing.
1.3.2 Sample
I use the Chilean IRS’s definition of a firm. All corporations are considered firms. An
individual is a firm if she pays the corporate income tax or declares to be an employer
of another individual. This is a very broad definition and therefore includes many
non-productive “shell” firms and single-worker firms. To deal with this, I drop all
firms that do not have at least one employee continuously - at the monthly frequency -
during 2008. This restriction drops many firms that appear intermittently in the data
and distort firm dynamics. Also, this restriction implies that the sample size is fixed
for 2008. From January 2009 firms exit the sample if they have zero employees. Then
I drop all firms that had less than five employees on average during 2008.17 Because
the empirical strategy relies on a measure of previous bank relationship I drop all
15This number considers switches where the wage is increasing or not changing at the moment
of the change in the contract only. There are different reasons explaining a decrease in the wage
after an observed switch. One of them is changes in worked hours (not observed) or salaries tied to
certain goals or performance. The average increase in wage for all switches during 2008 is 7%.
16The “Manual del Sistema de Deudores” available (in spanish) at www.sbif.cl contains a detailed
description of the banking data.
17This drop avoids results being driven by very small firms and is consistent with studies for the
US like Davis & Haltiwanger (1992) and Davis et al. (1996).
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firms whose average total bank debt during 2008 is less than 100 UFs (approximately
4.500 USD).18 Finally, I drop all firms in the financial sector to avoid potential double
counting in the banking data, and firms in the Public Administration and Defense
sector.
For banking debt variables, firms can have zero debt at any point in time. Given
that an important fraction of firms are not corporations but individuals (approxi-
mately 30%), I consider the sum of commercial and consumption debt as the relevant
measure of banking debt. I check the robustness of results to this definition by using
commercial loans only and find no significant difference.
Table 1.2 contains summary statistics of the sample for December 2008. It contains
37,833 firms with around 50 employees on average. Although not shown in the table,
there are 20 banks. There is a large variation in the employment, sales and debt
levels of firms. In the empirical analysis I assess how the size distribution matter for
results.
1.3.3 Specification
Following Chodorow-Reich (2014), if bank relationships are sticky, we might expect
BECH to prioritize its clients when lending out funds from the capital injection. If
this is the case, I can recover the credit supply shock at the firm level by comparing
lending for BECH clients versus non-clients before and after the capitalization. This
approach is also similar to Khwaja & Mian (2008), that recover a credit supply shock
at the firm level by constructing a measure of bank health after a nuclear test in
Pakistan. A key difference though is that I do not need to construct a measure of
bank health to link lending at the firm level with some exogenous shock at the bank
level. Neither do I need to check if the bank’s balance sheet shock was transmitted to
18UF stands for “Unidad de Fomento”, an inflation-indexed unit of account widely used in Chile.
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the firms.19 Instead, I can regress bank debt at the firm level on a measure of bank
relationship with BECH.
Borrowers and lenders form relationships to overcome inefficiencies caused by
asymmetric information. Through a relationship the firm provides information about
its business, which reduces the expected cost of providing capital to the lender. As
emphasized by Petersen & Rajan (1994), the effect of the lower cost of funds on the
interest rate offered by the bank is ambiguous, but we should expect, in general, a
positive effect on the availability of credit. Following their finding that bank relation-
ship matter for cheaper and greater availability of credit, and Chodorow-Reich (2014)
evidence on the syndicated loan market, I define a measure of bank relationship with
BECH as Treati equal to 1 if BECH was the firm’s main lender during the pre-shock
period and 0 otherwise. More precisely, Treati = 1 if the sum of firm i’s stock of
debt with BECH between January 2007 and December 2008 is greater than any other
bank’s in the same period.20 Treated firms are those with Treati = 1, while controls
are those with Treati = 0.
21 Note that this definition allows the existence of multiple
bank relationships.
The proposed baseline specification to recover the credit supply shock at the firm
level during the recession (i.e. in the short term) is the following:
logBDit =αi + δt + βTreatixPostt + ψXit + it (first stage) (1.1)
where logBDit is the log of total bank debt, that is, the sum of debt across banks
19As already shown in the previous section, BECH lent out most the fresh funds in a short period
of time.
20Ties are extremely unlikely given that bank debt is a continuous variable. However, if there is
a tie the firm is considered to have a relationship with BECH.
21Results are robust to other measures of bank relationship. For example, requiring that the main
bank holds at least X% of the firm’s total debt does not have an important effect on the estimates.
This is due to the fact that the main lender’s share of borrowing is high for both groups (83% on
average) as shown in Table 1.4. This is also the case for measures considering Treati = 1 when
BECH is the second or third bank.
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for firm i at time t;22 αi is a firm fixed effect that absorbs all unobserved static firm
characteristics, δt is a time fixed effect that absorbs all macro shocks, Xit is a set of
two time-varying firm level characteristics - used through all regressions in Chapter1
and Chapter 2: the number of bank relationships and the fraction of non-performing
loans of the firm; and it is an idiosyncratic error term. Finally, Postt is a dummy
equal to 1 after December 08 and 0 otherwise. Importantly, because both pre and
post periods consider a full year, seasonality should not affect results. The parameter
of interest, β represents the causal effect of the capitalization on BECH clients’ total
bank debt versus other firms. Thus equation (1.1) can be interpreted as test for
relationship banking.
The most important results in this chapter are related to the real effects of credit
supply shocks during recessions. To estimate the reduced form causal effects of
BECH’s capitalization on real variables at the firm level, such as employment or
churning, I use the same specification in equation (1.1) but using the real variable of
interest as dependent variable instead of logBDit:
logYit = αˇ
Y
i + δˇ
Y
t + βˇ
Y TreatixPostt + ψˇ
YXit + ˇ
Y
it (reduced form) (1.2)
Finally, to recover short term elasticities of real variables to bank credit I run
a Two Stage Least Squares regression where I use TreatixPostt as instrument for
logBDit:
logYit = α˜
Y
i + δ˜
Y
t + β˜
Y ˆlogBDit + ψ˜
YXit + ˜
Y
it (instrumental variables) (1.3)
In equation (1.3), because of the log-log specification, β˜Y can be interpreted as the
firm-level elasticity of variable Y to bank credit. Also, because of the log specification
in equations (1.1)-(1.2), β and βˇY should be interpreted as the expected percentage
22More precisely, I use the log(variable + 1) throughout the chapter to deal with zeros.
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change in the level of variable Y at treated firms versus that of controls during the
recession - that is between 2008 and 2009.
To deal with the potential time-varying component in the error term in equations
(1.1)-(1.3) errors are clustered at the firm level.23 Finally, regressions for all variables
except sales, profits and labor productivity are on monthly data from January 2007
to December 2009. To estimate the effect of credit supply shocks on sales, profits
and productivity, which have annual frequency, I modify equations (1.2) and (1.3) by
collapsing all variables in two periods - 2008 and 2009.
1.3.4 Identification
The differences in differences design allows to state the identification assumption as
parallel trends : dependent variables in equations (1.1)-(1.2) would follow the same
trend during the recession in absence of BECH’s capital injection. In terms of equa-
tions (1.1)-(1.3), consistent estimation of β, βˇY and β˜Y requires that the correlation
(TreatixPostt, it) equals 0 in (1.1) and corr(TreatixPostt, ˇ
Y
it) = 0 in (1.2). In other
words, TreatixPostt needs to capture the effect of the capitalization through changes
in credit supply only. BECH’s capitalization is arguably exogenous in the sense that
the bank was not in distress when intervened, thus there is no reason to believe that
the policy intervention was motivated for example, by an increasing rate of non-
performing loans by the bank’s clients. If that was the case, then we could suspect
that BECH clients were more affected by the downturn, which will immediately raise
concerns about the correlation between the bank relationship variable and unobserved
credit demand shocks. This is usually the first identification concern for papers like
Khwaja & Mian (2008) that use a measure of bank health to recover credit supply
23To deal with potential correlation at the main lender level and serial correlation, other papers
in the literature calculate standard errors clustering at the main lender level. Unfortunately, the
number of banks in this experiment - 20 - is not large enough and clustering at the main lender level
could understate the magnitude of standard errors according to Cameron et al. (2008).
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shocks at the firm level.
However, because BECH and its clients are not randomly matched, Treati could
be correlated with other factors - different from credit supply - determining logBDit
in equation (1.1) or logYit in equations (1.2) and (1.3). In particular, unobserved
demand shocks affecting differently treatment and control groups after December
2008 would bias estimates in equations (1.1)-(1.3).
Unobserved differential demand shocks could arise from treatment firms reacting
in a different way to the aggregate shock relative to controls, that is, being more (or
less) sensitive to the business cycle. For example, exporters could be more affected
by the adverse aggregate shock due to the steep decline in foreign demand, or un-
certainty could be higher in some industries, decreasing sales or demand for credit
and employment during downturns for those firms. If BECH specializes in lending to
firms more affected by the downturn then βˇ and β˜ would be biased as TreatixPostt
would capture both credit supply and demand effects. A negative correlation of the
unobserved demand shock with TreatixPostt would bias the estimated coefficient
towards zero: if firms that have BECH as their main lender tend to hoard relatively
less employment during downturns βˇEmployment and β˜Employment in equations (1.2)-
(1.3) would underestimate the effect of the capital injection on employment. The
opposite would happen if such correlation is positive.
Unobserved differential shocks in the post period are more likely to affect average
outcomes if treated and control firms are very heterogeneous in observable characteris-
tics or if they are not distributed similarly across economic sectors. It is important to
emphasize though, that the identification assumption does not require both groups to
be similar in their level characteristics. Figures 1·10 to 1·13 show that before the pol-
icy intervention both treatment and control groups are similarly distributed across
economic sectors in terms of number of firms, employment, bank debt and annual
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sales. This is unsurprising because BECH is a large bank that operates across all
business niches and has a balanced loan portfolio, thus closely replicating that of the
rest of the bank system. Table 1.4 shows summary statistics for treated and controls
before the policy intervention. They are on average similar in terms of firm character-
istics such as annual sales and age. They also have on average similar debt levels, risk
levels - measured as the fraction of non-performing loans - borrowing concentration
on the main lender and number of bank relationships. The mean and median number
of bank relationships for both groups is 2, which also explains similarities between
treatment and controls as more than half of treated firms also borrow from a bank
different from BECH. This implies that on average, unobserved demand shocks in the
treatment group also affect the control group. The most notable difference between
treated and controls is the average employment level.24 This difference is due to the
fact that BECH has the largest market share in the SME’s segment.
To support the identification assumption and show that treatment and control
groups react similarly to macro shocks, I first take advantage of the monthly frequency
of the data and show that there are no differential trends in the pre-shock period
(2008). This is important, because as shown in the previous section, signs of the
adverse aggregate shock were visible in the Chilean economy at least one quarter
before the policy intervention. In fact, commercial lending and domestic demand
growth came nearly to a halt in the last quarter of 2008. Thus, if firms in the treatment
and control groups reacted differently to the aggregate shock, the difference would be
observable in the pre-trends. I run pre-trend tests on the unconditional mean of the
linear trend - i.e. without using any controls - of treatment and control groups for
each variable at the monthly frequency and find no evidence of significant differential
24Note that tenure and wages are averages at the firm level. Specifically, the mean of these
variables corresponds to the unweighted mean of each group. Since smaller firms tend to pay lower
wages and treated firms are on average smaller than controls, we could expect the size-weighted
mean of the wage to be higher.
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trends. The second column of Panel A in Table 1.3 shows the results of the tests.25
A placebo experiment on financial and real variables that include annual sales,
profits, employment levels and flows, and bank debt confirms the idea that treatment
and control groups react similarly to the macro shock in 2008. I use the specification
in equation (1.2) collapsed in two periods, 2007 and 2008, and assume the policy
intervention happened in December 2007.26 As in the pre-trends case, the placebo
experiment should also capture a potential differential reaction to the aggregate shock
between treatment and control firms. Table 1.3 presents the results of the placebo
experiment and shows that having BECH as main lender does not explain outcomes
before the policy change. Note that both pre-trend tests and placebo experiments
are consistent across all real and financial outcome variables used in Chapter 1 and
Chapter 2 of this dissertation, confirming that it is unlikely that treated and control
firms would react differently to the business cycle.
Although there is no evidence of differential pre-trends in the data and both
treatment and control firms react similarly to the aggregate shock in 2008, the relative
larger fraction of small firms in the treatment group could still raise concerns about
different average sensitivities to the adverse aggregate demand shock between treated
and controls firms in the post period. As shown by Gertler & Gilchrist (1994) using
manufacturing data for the US, smaller firms exhibit sharper declines in sales during
periods of credit market tightening relative to large firms. In this view, smaller
firms are more credit constrained and therefore suffer more than larger firms when
aggregate conditions reduce the availability of credit. Fort et al. (2013) study how
firms of different age and size respond to the business cycle and emphasize that
25Only the differential pre-trend in Log Bank Debt is marginally significant at 10%. In the next
section I show that first stage results are robust to adding an interaction of the treatment variable and
a linear trend in the specification. Also, the coefficient for the placebo experiment is not significant.
26I run the regression on the subsample of firms that existed in 2007 - practically the same firms
as in the main sample. For variables at the monthly frequency using the specification in equations
(1.1) and (1.2)
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distinguishing between size and age is important, as “...many of the hypotheses about
why small firms should be more sensitive to variation to changes in credit conditions
are more relevant for start ups and young firms”. Firms anticipating countercyclical
behavior from the capitalized bank might self- select into it, which would also explain
the larger fraction of smaller firms in the treatment group. In turn, a larger fraction
of more credit constrained firms could be driving average results.
I address this concern by examining the heterogeneous impact of the capital in-
jection on firms’s total bank debt during the recession on firms of different size and
ages.27 Specifically I modify equation (1.2) in the following way:
logYit = αˇ
Y
i + δˇ
Y
t +Heti + βˇ
Y TreatixHetixPostt + ψˇ
YXit + ˇ
Y
it (heterogeneity)
(1.4)
where Heti is the size or age category of firm i before the policy change, that is
in 2008.
Results are shown in Tables 1.5 and 1.6. The impact is similar for micro, small
and medium firms, while not significant for large firms, which is likely explained by
the fact that large firms have access to additional sources of funding, such as capital
markets, as emphasized by Gertler & Gilchrist (1994). This shows that first stage
results are not driven by a larger fraction of SMEs in the treatment group. Moreover
heterogeneity results by firm age are consistent with Fort et al. (2013): the credit
supply shock is much larger (48 percentage points) for firms younger than five years
old, than for firms between five and ten years old (28 percentage points) and firms
older than ten (18 percentage points). This evidence supports the idea that firm
age captures the degree of informational frictions that the firm faces, especially when
borrowing from banks. As shown by Table 1.4, treatment and control groups have
27Following the definition of SME’s in Chile I use total annual sales of the firm in 2008 to determine
the size category. Annual sales are highly correlated with employment in the cross-section.
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almost identical distributions in terms of firm age, therefore we should not expect
first stage results be driven by differences in firms’s age either.
Others papers have found that labor demand responds differently to the business
cycle among firms of different size. Moscarini & Postel-Vinay (2012) show that larger
firms in the US destroy more jobs than smaller firms both late in recessions and
immediately following them. Also, Kahn & McEntarfer (2014) find that in the US
the growth rate of employment at low-paying firms is less sensitive to the current
unemployment rate. High-paying firms grow faster during booms and shrink faster
in busts. Because smaller firms tend to pay lower wages on average, as shown in
Table 1.4, the larger fraction of small firms in the treatment group could be driving
employment level results in the short and medium term. In particular, according to
these papers we should expect a positive effect in the level of employment at treated
firms because they would destroy fewer jobs relative to controls during the recession.
In section 1.4 I show that there is indeed a positive effect on employment at treated
firms relative to controls. However, as I show in section 2.1, this effect is not explained
by treatment firms destroying relatively fewer jobs, but by a higher effect on the hiring
margin relative to the separation margin. In fact, separations increase in treated firms
relative to controls during the recession, but the effect on hires is larger. In other
words, treated firms not only shrink less (on average) relative to controls, but also
churn more workers during the downturn.
In sum, the evidence presented in this section suggests that a larger fraction of
smaller firms in the treatment group should not pose a threat to the identification
assumption.
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1.4 Persistent Effects of Credit Supply Shocks
This section describes the short and medium term effects of the impact of the credit
supply shock on financial and real variables at the firm level. Real variables include
employment, annual sales, pre-tax profits and labor productivity. Labor productivity
is measured as sales per worker. To get a meaningful measure of the growth rate
of profits, which can be negative, I modify the growth rate definition in Davis et al.
(1996) in the following way:
gyit =

−2, if yit < 0 and yit−1 > 0
2, if yit > 0 and yit−1 < 0
yit − yit−1
0.5|yit + yit−1| , otherwise
As the original measure, this one is bounded between -2 and 2 - a feature of
practical importance in this type of data with many outliers - and can handle entries
and exits (i.e. zero profits in this case). Except for employment and bank debt,
variables have annual frequency, therefore to estimate the credit supply shock effect
on these variables I modify equations (1.2) and (1.3) by collapsing them in two periods.
Short term is defined as the period between January 2008 and December 2009, which
captures most of the impact of the recession in the labor market, as shown in section
1.2.1. Medium term covers up to December 2012. Finally, for all medium term
regressions data is at the annual frequency.
1.4.1 First Stage and Short Term Results
Table 1.7 shows the results for the first stage. The overall fall in commercial lending
at the firm level in the sample (approximated by the difference in log levels) during
2009 is 37 percentage points. This number reflects both a lower demand for credit
and a sharp contraction in lending by banks other than BECH. For the baseline
specification, during 2009 credit falls on average 25 percentage points less at firms
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that had a bank relationship with BECH versus those who did not, thus treated
credit fell two third less than that of control firms. This result is robust to different
empirical specifications as shown in Table 1.7, which includes a specification with no
exits, no controls and one with group trends - an interaction of a linear trend with
Treati. The no exits specifications runs a regression of the baseline specification over
a balanced panel of firms. Firms in the balanced panel are those that did not exit the
sample during 2009.28 The statistical equivalence of the estimators in the base and
no exits specifications shows that selection effects are not driving credit results, which
in turn is a consequence of the low level of attrition in the sample - illustrated by the
average periods that a firm stays in the sample. Finally, the large F statistic in all
specifications confirms a strong correlation between the instrument - TreatixPostt -
and logBDit in equation (1.3) (2SLS).
The average differential effect on employment between treatment and control firms
during 2009 is shown in Table 1.8, column 1. Employment at treated firms falls 2.1
percentage points less relative to controls in 2009. The estimated elasticity at the firm
level of employment to bank credit is 0.085 - approximately four times the reduced
form impact given the estimate in the first stage. The overall fall in employment in
the sample is 5.7 percentage points, thus employment fell approximately one third
less at firms that had a relationship with BECH than at those that did not. This
number can be interpreted as the overall impact of the contraction in lending during
the recession on employment for the sample.29 The overall effect of bank credit on
28As described in section 1.3.2, a firm exits the sample when it has no employees.
29To see this, an equivalent thought experiment is as follows. Given the identification assumption,
the proportional change in demand for credit in 2009 is the same in both control and treatment
groups. The overall effect on employment in the sample explained by credit supply factors is the
estimated elasticity of employment to bank credit at the firm level (0.085) times the differential
credit supply shock(25 percentage points, from the first stage) over the overall fall in employment
in the sample (5.7 percentage points), which equals 37 percentage points, so around a third. Note
that this result is independent of the estimate in the first stage as the elasticity is approximately
equal to the reduced form effect (2.1 percentage points) over such estimate (25 percentage points).
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employment is close to what Chodorow-Reich (2014) finds in his sample (between
40% and 66%) and larger than the implied effect in Greenstone et al. (2014), which
is at most 13%. Thus, these results confirm that bank driven credit supply shocks
have a significant impact on employment.
Other estimates in Table 1.8 further illustrate why credit matters during reces-
sions. Annual sales fall 6 percentage points less at treated firms, approximately a
fourth of the fall at controls. Profits during the downturn are also 6 percentage
points higher at treated firms, which implies that the fall in profits is two third less
at firms that had BECH as main lender relative to those who did not. The effect on
labor productivity is also positive and economically significant: 4 percentage points
higher at treated firms, around a third of the fall in controls. The effect on labor pro-
ductivity is explained by the larger response of annual sales relative to employment.
In fact, given that labor productivity is measured as sales per worker and given the
log specification, this effect can be approximated by the difference between the sales
and employment coefficients.
Finally, the elasticities to bank credit of specification (2) in Table 1.8 provide an
idea of the magnitude of the impact of credit during the downturn: for an additional
10% in bank debt, a firm’s annual sales increase almost 3% in a twelve month period.
Elasticities for pre-tax profits and labor productivity imply that an additional 10% in
bank credit makes firms 2.5% more profitable and 2% more productive. A relatively
low elasticity of employment to credit - compared to those of other real variables -
may suggest that credit availability during the downturn is not related to employment
adjustments at the firm level. However, as I show in section 2.1.1, an important
part of employment adjustments during the recession do not translate into changes
in employment levels, as firms also use credit to increase worker turnover. Higher
worker turnover in turn, is related to improvements in labor productivity at some
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firms.
1.4.2 Medium Term Results
Now I move to the evolution of financial and real causal effects of having a previous
bank relationship with BECH during the recovery period and afterwards (2010-2012).
Table 1.9 and Figures 1·14 to 1·17 show the estimates (βt) for the following specifi-
cation for the different dependent variables:
logYit = α
Y
i + Y ear
Y
t +
t=2012∑
t=2008
βYt TreatixPosttxY eart + ψ
YXit + 
Y
it (1.5)
These estimates represent the cumulative effect of having a bank relationship with
BECH on variable Y at time t. The path of causal effects over time reveals important
facts about the dynamics of the impact of credit supply shocks.
First, credit availability during the recession is not only important for firms in the
short term, but also afterwards, when aggregate demand recovers. While credit effects
dissipate quickly - showing that the credit supply shock is temporary - employment
and sales effects peak a year later (2010), during the recovery phase.
Second, four years after the downturn the causal effect of having a bank relation-
ship with BECH on sales is still large and significant (7.6 percentage points) while
the credit effect has completely vanished.
Third, while the causal effect of the credit supply shock on sales is persistent, the
effect on employment is not, which in turn leads to a persistent and significant effect
on labor productivity (6.4 percentage points four years after the downturn). In fact,
after peaking at 8 percentage points in 2010, the effect on labor productivity vanishes
slowly at a rate of 1 percentage point per year. At this rate, it would take ten years
for the effect to completely disappear, while the effect on bank debt lasts only 2 years.
Table 1.10 reports the average reduced form effects and elasticities for the 2009-
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2012 period. Consistent with the temporary nature of the credit supply shock and
the persistent effects on sales and labor productivity, medium term elasticities of such
variables are much larger than their short term counterparts. Over the four years after
the capital injection, firm bank debt is only 12 percentage points higher at treated
firms relative to controls, around a half of the effect in the twelve months after the
capital injection. Sales on the other hand are on average 10 percentage points higher
at treated firms in four years, with an elasticity to credit of 0.8, which means that
a 10% increase in bank debt leads to an 8% increase in annual sales on average for
four years. Employment and labor productivity medium term average elasticities to
credit are 0.25 and 0.53 respectively, also showing the economic significance of the
impact of the credit supply shock.
1.5 Discussion
Credit and real outcomes estimates highlight the relevance of bank lending during
recessions.
Results in the first stage confirm that bank relationships matter. A potential
concern for the estimation in equation (1.1) is that firms could have switched to (or
borrow more from) the capitalized bank after the announcement, which would bias
the estimate of the credit supply shock towards zero. If firms can easily switch banks
it means that to a great extent bank relationships do not determine credit availability.
However, the large estimate of the credit supply shock as a result of the capitalization
reveals that at least in the short run non-client firms could not immediately borrow
from the capitalized bank, even though increasing lending was a primary objective of
the policy.
Estimates on firms’employment, sales and profits further confirm the idea that
bank relationships matter and show the importance of external funding for firms
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during the recession. Firms with better access to credit do not only exhibit relatively
higher employment levels, consistent with the evidence in Chodorow-Reich (2014)
for the US, but also are able to sustain higher sales and profits. Therefore, credit
allows them to cope better with the aggregate adverse shock and remain healthier.
Importantly, under the identification assumption higher sales are not explained by
different demand shocks between treatment and control groups.
Instead, higher investment in different forms of capital may explain the larger
effect on sales, and in particular why this estimate is larger than the employment
estimate. Lower capital destruction by treated firms would be in line with Campello
et al. (2010), who find that financially distressed firms are forced to sell more assets
to sustain operations in recessions. Also, more credit constrained firms may be forced
to forgo profitable projects, like in Gilchrist et al. (2015) where firms invest in market
share by lowering their prices to attract new costumers. According to their findings,
credit constrained firms are forced to increase prices during a recession therefore
sacrificing investments in customer capital, which will in turn have a direct effect on
firm sales.
A novel finding in this chapter is that temporary financial shocks during recessions
can have persistent causal effects on real outcomes at the firm level. Although credit
and employment short term effects dissipate in the medium term, sales and labor
productivity effects do not. These findings together with the evidence on the path
of employment and sales effects over time suggest that firms use credit during the
recession to undertake investments that allow them to grow faster and expand after
the adverse aggregate shock has passed. In particular, the fact that the effect on labor
productivity is highly persistent and vanishes slowly over time, shows that either total
factor productivity (TFP) at treated firms is persistently higher after the shock, or
physical capital is.
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Identifying the contribution of the causal effect of credit on labor productivity
through capital versus TFP would help understanding the mechanisms explaining
persistent real effects. However, assessing the contribution of each channel is difficult
as I do not observe a precise measure of capital investment at the firm level. Fur-
thermore, even with a measure of capital, estimating the contribution of alternative
channels that would show up in the data as higher TFP effects is not possible without
adding additional structure to the empirical setting. However, using the estimated
employment and sales effects on a simple production function, I can decompose the
effect of credit on TFP and capital under different assumptions to illustrate the mag-
nitude of the effects required to explain the persistent effect on labor productivity.
To decompose TFP and capital effects using the estimated sales and employment
effects I use a standard Cobb-Douglas production function calibrated for the Chilean
economy30. For each firm in the treatment group:
log(SalesTit) = log(TFP
T
it ) + 0.6
∗log(EmploymentTit) + 0.4
∗log(CapitalTit) + µ
T
it
subtracting the same expression for the control group, taking expectations and
differentiating each time t with respect to 2008,
βˆSalest = β
TFP
t + 0.6
∗βˆEmploymentt + 0.4
∗βCapitalt
where βˆYt are the estimates from equation (1.5).
Table 1.11 shows two hypothetical scenarios for this exercise. The first one assumes
no causal effect of credit on TFP and recovers the effect on capital. For capital to
explain the total differential impact on sales, it would have to grow 27% more in
treated firms relative to controls in only two years and remain persistently higher
30Shares of labor and capital are the share in income from National Accounts from the Central
Bank of Chile.
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at 17% four years after the downturn and one year after the effect on bank debt
has completely vanished. The second scenario assumes that capital is as sensitive to
the credit supply shock as employment - that is βˆEmploymentt = βˆ
Capital
t ∀t. In this
case, the causal effect on TFP would have to be 9% two years after the shock and
approximately equal to the effect on sales four years after.
This exercise shows that the implied causal effects of credit availability on either
channel are large and persistent. Also, for sensible assumptions about the causal
effect of credit on capital over time, the causal effect on TPF has to be large and
economically significant.
Even though I cannot distinguish the causal effect of credit on labor productivity
through capital investment versus TFP, the empirical design and the data available
do allow me to study one particular mechanism that would lead to persistently higher
labor productivity at treated firms.
In the next chapter I ask how firms make use of credit to adjust employment dur-
ing the recession and in particular whether they use it to improve labor productivity
by selecting better matches. In the presence of search and separation costs, selecting
a better workforce is a form of investment for the firm. Although firms should opti-
mally concentrate productivity-enhancing adjustments during the downturn - when
the opportunity cost is lower, the lack of financing could prevent firms from undertak-
ing such adjustments.31 Firms able to optimally adjust during the recession should
have persistently higher TFP relative to firms that did not as after the recession the
incentive to undertake productivity-enhancing investments diminishes.
31Caballero & Hammour (1996) present empirical evidence and a theoretical framework where
firms optimally concentrate adjustment during recessions due to the lower opportunity cost.
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Figure 1·1: Chile’s total and mining exports 2007-2012. Price index
Figure 1·2: Chile’s total and mining exports 2007-2012. Year on year growth rate
(value FOB)
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Figure 1·3: Chile’s GDP and domestic demand. Year on year growth rate 2007-2012
Figure 1·4: Gross formation of fixed capital in Chile. Year on year growth rate
2007-2012
30
Figure 1·5: Total employment in Chile. Year on year growth rate 2007-2012
Figure 1·6: Unemployment rate in Chile 2007-2012
31
Figure 1·7: Commercial loans in Chile by the banking system w/o BECH 2008-2012.
Millions CLP
Figure 1·8: Commercial loans in Chile by BECH 2008-2012. Millions CLP
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Figure 1·9: BECH’s historical countercyclical lending and economic activity. Year
on year growth rate 1990-2008
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Figure 1·10: Distribution of the number of firms for treated and control firms across
industries in 2008.
Figure 1·11: Distribution of total employment for treated and control firms across
industries in 2008.
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Figure 1·12: Distribution of total debt for treated and control firms across industries
in 2008.
Figure 1·13: Distribution of total sales for treated and control firms across industries
in 2008.
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Figure 1·14: Firm-level cumulative effect on debt of having BECH as the main
lender before the capital injection. Dashes lines correspond to a 95% confidence
interval. Standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Figure 1·15: Firm-level cumulative effect on employment of having BECH as the
main lender before the capital injection. Dashes lines correspond to a 95% confidence
interval. Standard errors clustered at the firm level.
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Figure 1·16: Firm-level cumulative effect on sales of having BECH as the main
lender before the capital injection. Dashes lines correspond to a 95% confidence
interval. Standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Figure 1·17: Firm-level cumulative effect on labor productivity of having BECH
as the main lender before the capital injection. Dashes lines correspond to a 95%
confidence interval. Standard errors clustered at the firm level.
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Table 1.1: This Table shows the use of short term contracts by economic sector.
Sector Relative Size is calculated using total employment. The column Temporary
is the fraction of workers in short term contracts hired for a specific task or time.
Less than one year is the fraction with no specif task or defined time. Workers on
training and trial programs fall in this category. Other involves alternatives purposes
for using short term contracts such as replacement of workers on leave.
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Table 1.2: This table shows summary statistics for the sample for December 2008.
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Table 1.3: This Table shows estimates for a differential pre-trends test between
treated and control firms, and a placebo experiment. Estimates in the pre-trend
test are the estimates of a regression of the dependent variable on the interaction of
the treatment variable and a linear trend at the monthly frequency between January
2008 and December 2008. The Placebo experiment runs the same specifications in
equations (1) and (2) in the text but a year before the policy intervention, that is
from January 2007 to December 2008, assuming that the capital inject took place on
December 2008.
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Table 1.5: Reduce form estimates of heterogeneous effects by size.
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Table 1.6: Reduce form estimates of heterogeneous effects by age.
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Table 1.7: Firs stage results. This table shows the effect of having BECH as the
main lender on total debt during the recession for different specifications. No exits
considers firms that do not exit the sample during 2009. No controls runs the base
specification without firm time-varying controls. Group trend adds a liner trend
interacted with the treatment variable to the base specification.
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Table 1.8: Real effects. This Table shows the effects of having BECH as the main
lender on firm employment, sales, pre-tax profits and labor productivity (1). Specifi-
cation (2) estimates the elasticity of these outcomes to bank debt at the firm level.
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Table 1.9: Reduced form differential cumulative effects.
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Table 1.10: Medium term effects. This table shows estimates from 2008 to 2012.
Estimates represent the average effect of having BECH as the main lender over the
four years after the capital injection.
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Table 1.11: Different scenarios for potential medium term cumulative effects on
capital and TFP.
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Chapter 2
Financing Firing and Hiring
2.1 Labor Demand During the Downturn
In this chapter I analyze how firms make use of credit to finance costly employment
adjustments during recessions and whether such adjustments are linked to improve-
ments in firms’ labor productivity. I use the same empirical strategy and data set
described in Chapter 1 to assess one particular mechanism that would partially ex-
plain the medium term labor productivity results presented in the previous chapter.
I investigate such mechanism by studying whether firms take advantage of credit
availability to select high-quality matches. I start by showing that treated firms
engage in more hires and separations relative to controls during the recession. Thus
effects on the level of employment presented in Chapter 1 are not explained by treated
firms destroying fewer jobs, but rather by a larger effect on treated firms’ hiring
margin. A positive effect on both hires and separations suggests that the differential
effect on worker turnover at the firm level is also positive.
Worker turnover or “churning”, defined as the part of worker flows not explained
by changes in the firm’s total number of employees, plays a central role in labor
reallocation and productivity. To the extent that match quality is an experience good,
churning is partially explained by firms’ selection of high-quality matches. During
recessions churning falls as workers are more reluctant to quit their jobs and a larger
fraction of employment flows is accounted for by job destruction. Lazear & Spletzer
(2012) investigate the fall in churn in the US during the 2008-09 recession and argue
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that the cost of recession-induced decreases in churn might be substantial, depending
on the persistence of the aggregate shock. In my sample, average churn fell 11%
from 2008 to 2009. On an annual basis, this means that the average firm - with 47
employees in 2008 - churned approximately 10 fewer workers in 2009. I estimate the
causal effect of the credit supply shock on churning and find that the growth rate
of churned workers falls 3.3 percentage points less in treated firms with respect to
controls.
To show that treated firms use credit to improve the quality of their workforce, I
make use of a feature of the Chilean labor market law: the existence of two contract
types. Chile’s short term labor contracts have zero severance costs but cannot exceed
a year in duration, and are typically used for trial and training purposes. Longer term
or indefinite duration contracts have severance costs of a month’s wage per year of
tenure, and no maximum duration. I first check whether higher churning happens in
short term contracts and whether treated firms exhibit larger flows from short to long
term contracts, thus potentially reflecting a more selective hiring process. I find that
indeed higher churn of all types of workers is explained by higher churn of workers
on short term contracts that later switch to a long term contract. The evidence is
consistent across firms that are expanding and shrinking during the downturn.
Finally, I check for evidence on selective firing. Since the quality of matches is
not observable, I examine whether treated firms can finance higher firing costs, which
would typically prevent selective firing. In particular, by using credit to finance
severance payments, firms can break matches that have become unproductive over
time. To measure dismissal costs, I use the wage and tenure of each worker on a
long term contract in the sample to construct a measure of severance payment at the
worker level. I then average this measure for all separations of long term contracts
at each firm during the recession and get the average severance payment for each
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firm in the sample. I find that the change in the severance payment is much larger
for shrinking treated firms than shrinking controls (28 percentage points), which is
consistent with what we could expect from the theory.
For all regressions I use the specification in equation (1.2) on data at the monthly
frequency from January 2008 to December 2009 (i.e. in the short term).
2.1.1 Worker Flows and Churning
I start by regressing separations and hires at the firm level on the measure of bank
relationship. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2.1 show the results of the reduced form
causal effect of the credit supply shock on hires and separations. These estimates
should be interpreted as the differences in the expected growth rates of the monthly
average flow between treated and control firms, approximated by the differences in
logs.
The first relevant fact about labor demand is that the expected growth rate in
both separations and hires is higher for treatment firms relative to that of controls
during the recession. The growth rate of separations is 1.8 percentage points higher
at treated firms, while the growth rate of hires is 3.1 percentage points higher. Both
estimators are statistically significant at the 1% level. Put in context, given that in
the sample the average fall for separations and hires is 6.9% and 10.9% respectively,
these estimates show that separations and hires fall approximately a fourth less in
treated firms versus controls.
Therefore employment level effects shown in section 4 are not explained by treated
firms destroying fewer jobs. Instead, the larger effect in hires relative to separa-
tions explains the positive effect on employment. Given that under the identification
assumption labor demand shocks are spread evenly among treatment and control
groups, the previous result implies that the optimal response of unconstrained firms
is to adjust employment on both separation and hiring margins. That is, less credit
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constrained firms exhibit larger worker flows - i.e. the sum of hires and separations.
Columns 4 in Table 2.1 shows the causal effect of credit on worker flows: they fall
2.6 percentage points less at treated versus control firms. In the aggregate, larger
worker flows imply greater fluidity in the labor market, which is usually linked to
improved allocative efficiency in the economy.1 However at the firm level, because
larger worker flows are partially explained by changes in the level of employment,
they do not necessarily reflect improvements in productivity.
In order to improve labor productivity by selecting better matches firms must
destroy and eventually replace the least productive ones. Therefore changes in worker
replacement by treated versus control firms could potentially reflect changes in labor
productivity. To evaluate how credit affects worker replacement at the firm level I
look at worker churn. Worker churn or “churning” in the definition by Burgess et al.
(2000) is the part of worker flows in excess of job reallocation, that is
Worker Flowsit = Hit + Sit = |Eit - Eit−1| + Churningit
where Eit is the employment level in firm i at time t, equivalently
Churningit = Worker Flowsit - Job Reallocationit
2
1Larger worker flows at firm level imply higher “job turnover” in the economy. Hopenhayn &
Rogerson (1993) build a general equilibrium model and find that the welfare cost of reducing job
turnover by 25% is 2.8% in steady state. Pries & Rogerson (2005) provide a theoretical framework
that links job and worker flows. In their model firms increase worker flows to create better-quality
matches in a world where match quality is an experience good. They find that negative changes
in worker flows have negative welfare implications. Finally, in a recent study Davis & Haltiwanger
(2014) provide empirical evidence for the US on job and worker flows and argue that reduced labor
market fluidity has a negative impact on productivity, real wages and employment.
2The measurement of worker flows varies depending on the frequency at which the flow is defined.
At the quarterly frequency for example, it has to be decided if flows in and out within the same
quarter are to be considered in the definition. In particular, the frequency at which flows are defined
matter for the measurement of churning. Here, worker flows are measured at the monthly frequency,
therefore to increase churning both flows in and out of the firm must occur in the same month,
otherwise those flows will be considered part of job reallocation and not churning. I also used a
measure at the annual frequency - not reported - and results do not change significantly. For more
details on the measurement on worker flows see Davis et al. (2006).
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As pointed out by Burgess et al. (2000), churning occurs essentially as the reeval-
uation of a job match. Match reevaluations can occur if the quality of a match is to
some extent an experience good and can come either from firms or workers. Thus
firms churn workers either to improve labor productivity or to replace quits.3
During recessions churning falls as workers are more reluctant to quit their jobs
and a larger fraction of employment flows is accounted for by job destruction. Lazear
& Spletzer (2012) document the fall in churn in the US during the 2008-09 recession
and argue that productivity losses due to lower labor mobility can be important.
Figure 2·1 shows the evolution of the average monthly churning rate in Chile during
the recession.4 The drop and slow recovery are visible after 2008. In the sample,
average churn fell 11% from 2008 to 2009. On an annual basis, this means that the
average firm - with 47 employees in 2008 - churned approximately 10 fewer workers
in 2009.
The third column in Table 2.1 shows the estimated causal effect of the credit
supply shock on churning. The average monthly number of churned workers falls 3.3
percentage points less at treated firms, around a fourth of the fall in the control group.
Higher churn shows that larger worker flows at treated firms are not explained by a
larger effect on job reallocation - i.e changes in the level of employment. In fact, the
impact of credit is larger on churning flows than in job flows - the difference between
hires and separations - which means that on average treated firms are replacing more
workers to support the expansion in employment relative to controls.5 This result
3Note that time variation on churning may reflect changes on firms’ labor productivity. On the
other hand, cross-sectional variation in churning does not necessarily reflect differences in matching
efficiency. The level of churning across firms may vary depending on several factors such as search
and firing costs faced by the firm, personnel policies, technology or labor regulations. For example,
firms facing higher adjustment costs will put a higher effort in screening before forming a match
with a worker, which will in turn decrease average churn. Given the differences in differences design,
in this paper all estimated effects are on the time variation of churning during the recession.
4The churning rate is defined as the number of workers churned at the firm level normalized by
the firm’s average employment level between the current and the previous period.
5The larger effect on churning relative to employment also shows that a constant rate of quits
53
suggests that indeed firms use credit to select better quality matches. Furthermore,
because effects on churning are only explained by differences in credit availability
and given that the selection process entails search costs, this result also suggests that
treated firms increase churning because they can finance employment adjustment
costs.
Next, I look for direct evidence that higher worker churn at treated firms is linked
to a selection process of better matches. I also look for evidence showing that firms
make use of credit to finance employment adjustment costs during the downturn,
which is key to the link between credit availability and improvements of the firm’s
workforce. To this end, I take advantage of the existence of short and long term
contracts in the Chilean labor market.
2.1.2 Short and Long Term Contracts
As shown in section 1.3.1, firms are required to pay a severance payment when firing
workers on long term contracts but not on short term contracts. Therefore short term
contracts are often used by firms for trial purposes when filling long term vacancies,
which are usually associated with high-quality matches. To look for direct evidence
that firms use credit to finance employment adjustment costs and select a better
workforce I proceed in two steps.
First, I look at churning in short term contracts and flows within the firm from
short to long term.6 If firms use credit to select better matches when filling long term
vacancies, I should observe a positive differential effect on churning of short term
contracts together with a higher flow to long term.
Second, I look for evidence of selective firing by examining if treated firms are
cannot explain the effect on churning.
6Churning at short and long term contracts is defined as in equation (2.1.1) Worker flows include
flows in and out of the firm only, therefore flows that imply changes in the type of contract within
the firm are not included. The level E is the level of the type of contract.
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able to finance larger separation costs, which may prevent the firm from firing low-
productive workers. In particular, firing high tenured workers that have become
unproductive over time will be more expensive as the severance payment required by
law will be larger. Using information on tenure (A years) and monthly wages (W ) I
construct an approximate measure of severance payment for each worker j at time t
on a long term contract in a firm i in the sample,
SPjit = min{WjitAjit; 11Wjit}
I then average the measure over all separations of long term contracts at time t
in firm i and regress it on the measure of bank relationship. Importantly, this is a
measure of “potential” severance payment as I do not observe the actual payment by
the firm.
Table 2.2 presents results for this section. Estimates in Column 2 show that the
average churning effect in the previous section is explained by higher churning at
short term contracts. The differential causal effect for treated versus control firms is
3.2 percentage points and significant at 1%. Thus firms with better access to credit
churn more workers in contracts typically used for trial purposes.
Estimates in the third column in Table 2.2 show that the causal effect of credit
on flows from short to long term contracts within the firm during the recession is
also positive. Short to long term flows fall 1.7 percentage points less at treated firms,
around a fifth of the fall in controls. Together with the estimate on short term
contracts churning, this result implies that treated firms are filling relative more long
term vacancies by first learning about candidates by having them working at the firm
on a short term contract, which is consistent with the idea that match quality is
to some extent an experience good. If match quality were an inspection good, then
firms would become more selective by screening candidates before offering a contract,
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which would not lead to higher churn.7
Although the evidence showed so far demonstrates that firms with better access
to credit churn more workers, and that higher churn is associated with the selection of
high-quality matches, the evidence on firms using credit to finance adjustment costs
is not as clear. Estimates in column four in Table 2.2 show that on average there is
no significant difference between treated and control firms in the average severance
payments entailed by separations during the downturn. This is likely due to fact
that average responses among shrinking and expanding firms hide differential forms
of employment adjustments during the recession, which in turn affects the way firms
use credit to finance these adjustments. For example, shrinking firms have more
incentives to use credit to selectively fire low-productivity workers than expanding
firms.
More generally, worker flows at the firm level are highly asymmetric depending
on the firm’s rate of expansion as shown by Davis et al. (2006), which motivates the
study differential responses by expanding and shrinking during the recession. This is
what I do in the next section.
2.1.3 Expanding and Shrinking Firms
Following Davis et al. (2006), Figures 2·2 to 2·4 show how separations, hires and
churning vary with the firm’s growth rate in the sample for 2008. The asymmetry
in hires and separations shows that separations increase with job losses at contract-
ing establishments while hires increase with job growth at expanding establishment.
Churning captures separations by expanding establishments and hires by shrinking
establishments. The asymmetry in churning by shrinking and expanding firms also
hints potential different uses of credit during the recession.
7This is likely the case for high-skill positions for which firm spend more resources on selection
and offer a long term contract directly.
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Expanding firms facing a positive demand shock experience an increase in the
marginal productivity of all types of matches, which makes vacancies more costly.
Thus, they will try to fill quits quickly rather than spend resources replacing low-
productivity matches.8 The impact on average labor productivity will depend on
whether they become more or less selective in the new hires.
Shrinking firms on the other hand can increase average labor productivity by
selectively firing less productive matches. Selective firing has been emphasized in
the literature to explain the countercyclical behavior of average labor productivity in
the US in the past two recessions.9 Additionally, shrinking firms may have greater
incentives to replace low-quality matches than expanding firms, because the relative
opportunity cost is lower: arguably, firms shrink after experiencing a negative demand
shock, which reduces the marginal productivity of all factors, lowering the opportunity
cost of replacing them.
To asses whether expanding and shrinking firms make use of credit to select better
matches I look at heterogeneous responses during the downturn. Specifically, I use
the specification in equation (1.4) and define Heti equal to 1 if firm’s i employment
growth rate is ≥ 0 during 2009.
Table 2.3 summarizes the main results for expanding and shrinking firms during
the recession. First, the effect on churning of all workers is the same for expanding
and shrinking firms. Churning falls 3.2 percentage points less at expanding treated
firms versus expanding controls, and by the same number at shrinking treated firms
versus shrinking controls. In both cases the effect is significant at 1%. Therefore the
average (causal) effect of credit on churning at treated firms reported in the previous
8Davis et al. (2013) using data for the US, show that the vacancy fill rate rises steeply with
the firm’s expansion rate. They also show that firms spend resources engaging in what they call
“recruitment intensity” to increase the pace of new hires. The concept refers to all instruments other
than vacancies that firms use for recruitment, such as advertising and screening expenditures.
9See Koenders & Rogerson (2005).
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section is not explained by the expansion rate of the firm.
Something similar happens with churning of short term contracts and flows from
short to long term within the firm. Estimates are also positive and significant at
both expanding and shrinking firms. The differential effect on short term churning at
expanding firms is 3.2 percentage points while at shrinking firms it is 1.8 percentage
points. The effect on flows from short to long term is independent from the rate of
expansion of the firm and therefore equal to 1.7 percentage points.
The main difference between expanding and shrinking firms is on the estimate of
the severance payment. As expected, it is not significant for expanding firms but large
and economically significant for shrinking firms. The potential severance payment
at treated shrinking firms is 28 percentage points larger than at control shrinking
firms, which indicates that these firms indeed use credit to finance separation costs.
Furthermore, the fact that the effect on the level of long term employment is not
significant at shrinking firms suggests that treated shrinking firms are replacing long
term vacancies, which is consistent with the idea that these firms are improving
average labor productivity. For expanding firms instead, larger flows from short to
long term contracts are accompanied by a positive effect on the employment level of
long term contracts (2.7 percentage points).
2.2 Discussion
Overall, the evidence presented in this chapter shows that higher churning happens at
firms with better access to credit regardless of their expansion rate. Also, the evidence
suggests that both expanding and shrinking firms make use of credit to select better
matches. Consistent with what we could expect from the theory, expanding firms
do not seem to make use of credit to replace low-productivity matches, but rather
to fill long term vacancies fast during the downturn. Shrinking firms on the other
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hand make use of credit to replace low-quality matches by financing employment
adjustments costs therefore increasing average labor productivity.
59
Figure 2·1: Monthly churning rate during 2007-2012. The churning rate is defined
as Chrit =
Chit
0.5∗ (Eit + Eit−1) .
Figure 2·2: Average monthly separation rate in Chile before the policy change(zoom)
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Figure 2·3: Average monthly hiring rate in Chile before the policy change (zoom)
Figure 2·4: Average monthly churning rate in Chile before the policy change
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Table 2.1: Labor market flows. This table shows the estimates of the causal effect
of credit on different worker flows at the firm level.
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Table 2.2: Short and long term contracts. This table shows the estimates of the
causal effect of credit on different worker flows for short and long term contracts at
the firm level.
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Chapter 3
Credit Constraints and Guarantees for
Small Firms
This chapter is based on a paper co-authored with William Mullins, Assistant Pro-
fessor of Finance at the Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland.
3.1 Introduction
Governments around the world continue to take action to tackle longstanding SME
financing difficulties. Credit guarantees remain the most widely used instrument, with
many countries expanding and introducing novel features to their credit guarantee
programmes.
Angel Gurria, OECD Secretary General, OECD (2016).
Small firms are widely held to be credit constrained, and as a result Governments
across the world have portfolios of programs to support small business’ access to
finance. Public Credit Guarantee Schemes (CGS) are the most widespread – and often
claimed as the most effective policy tool to increase lending to small firms (Beck et al.
(2010) and Beck et al. (2008)). CGS repay lenders a percentage of a loan’s principal
in case of default, reducing the need for the borrower to post collateral, and they often
cover vast volumes of credit: in 2014 government CGS guaranteed loans equivalent
to 5.7% of GDP in Japan and 4.1% in Korea - OECD (2016), while the US’s Small
Business Administation (SBA) guaranteed nearly 24 billion of loans in 2015 alone -
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Dilger (2016). Moreover, in reaction to the 2008-09 financial crisis, Government CGS
were at the forefront of the effort to stimulate lending to firms. However, despite
their size and ubiquity, concerns remain regarding the value of CGS - e.g. De Meza
(2002); Green (2003); Gropp et al. (2014). Using a unique data set of Chilean firms
and a regression discontinuity design, this paper examines the effectiveness of CGS.
In an ideal setting a CGS would direct the guarantee towards creditworthy firms
with positive NPV projects. Further, firms benefiting from the scheme would be
credit constrained, so the CGS would improve the allocation of funds across firms and
result in financial additionality – loans covered by the guarantee would not have been
made (or would have been materially smaller) in the absence of the scheme. Finally,
these firms would display positive real effects of credit access, such as increased sales
or probability of survival. Unfortunately, the net effects of CGS could instead be
markedly different. Firstly, CGS could direct lending towards firms without positive
NPV projects by exacerbating moral hazard and adverse selection problems, leading
to unsustainable default rates and undermining the sustainability of the scheme, or
could be used to shift bad loans to the Government balance sheet. Furthermore,
guaranteed loans may be assigned to firms that are unconstrained, and that would
have received loans in any case, resulting in no real effects (or negative real effects)
of the scheme. Thus, how and in what ways CGS work is an empirical question.
In general, it is difficult to identify the causal impact of CGSs on firms because
those firms that receive a guaranteed loan are not randomly selected: the scheme
may be more attractive to strong firms, or to weak firms (applicant self-selection),
and the bank or guarantee agency is also likely to have incentives to apply the guar-
antee to firms with characteristics unobservable to the econometrician (selection by
the guarantee distributor). Thus, the firms that actually receive the guaranteed loans
will differ from the remaining firms along an unknown number of dimensions, mak-
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ing the construction of an appropriate counterfactual group extremely difficult, and
rendering the selection bias from estimations that do not fully resolve this problem
potentially very large, and of indeterminate sign. This challenge has meant that there
is surprisingly little evidence based on a robust identification strategy regarding the
most basic feature of such schemes – financial additionality – and there is still less on
the real effects of CGS on borrowers.
This paper overcomes the obstacles posed by selection bias and the absence of an
appropriate control group by examining Chile’s FOGAPE Credit Guarantee Scheme
in 2011-2012 using a regression discontinuity design (RDD) together with a compre-
hensive administrative data set covering all the firms in the economy. FOGAPE has
an average guarantee rate of almost 80% of the loan principal, and private banks
choose to which of their borrowers’ new loans it is applied, and must perform all the
credit screening, monitoring and, if necessary, debt collection functions. The RDD
compares firms that just missed out on being eligible for FOGAPE with firms that
are – just – eligible. To do so, we make use of the fact that the variable determining a
firm’s eligibility, its annual sales, is extremely opaque and costly to manipulate, and
so whether a firm is eligible for FOGAPE in a given month is plausibly random in
a narrow range around the eligibility threshold. Intuitively, firms are as-if-randomly
assigned around the eligibility threshold, which naturally generates two groups free
of selection bias: a “treatment group” (all the eligible firms near the threshold) and a
control group: all the firms that narrowly missed out on being eligible. Comparison
of the two groups, coupled with a rich dataset of the population of firms near the
threshold (as opposed to the more usual sample) provides a clean causal estimate of
the impact of eligibility for FOGAPE on firm-level outcomes, because no selection
bias is possible – all the nearby firms are in the data, not a selected subset. Further-
more, the RDD, when paired with the rich data used in the paper, permits a rigorous
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examination of whether firms are as-if-randomly assigned around the threshold.
We then move to estimate the effect on firms that actually receive a guarantee
(treated firms henceforth), as opposed to the effect on eligible firms, the majority of
which do not receive a guarantee. However, actual treatment is endogenously chosen
by both firms, which choose to apply, and by banks, which decide which firms receive
the guarantee. This double choice means that a simple comparison of treated and
untreated firms would be subject to a double selection bias, as described earlier. We
meet this challenge by making use of the fact that eligibility is a valid instrumental
variable for treatment in the region around the threshold, allowing the use of a fuzzy
RDD design. This estimates the effect on treated firms that are “compliers” in the
region around the threshold, that is, firms that receive the guarantee only if they were
eligible - Angrist et al. (1996).
Our estimates indicate that FOGAPE provides substantial financial additionality:
treated firms approximately double their total debt. Moreover, the debt increase at
the bank granting FOGAPE does not appear to reduce firms’ overall debt capacity,
because debt at other banks also rises steadily over the subsequent year. This increase
in debt at other banks suggests that the guarantee scheme allows firms to use whatever
collateral they may have for additional loans, thus amplifying the effect of the CGS –
a novel empirical result to our knowledge. Furthermore, the large increase in debt, all
of which is additional – i.e., causally attributable to FOGAPE – is strong evidence of
treated firms laboring under substantial financial constraints. As in Banerjee & Duflo
(2014), the fact that firms do not use the guaranteed lending to substitute for other,
unsubsidized loans is prima facie evidence that firms are financially constrained.
An important, novel finding of this paper is that FOGAPE is used by firms and
banks as a bridge to building new bank relationships, and to expand weak relation-
ships. In the light of the now well-developed empirical literature on the transmission
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of negative bank capital and liquidity shocks to their borrowers (for example, see
Peek & Rosengren (2000); Khwaja & Mian (2008); Paravisini (2008); Iyer & Peydro´
(2011); Schnabl (2012); Chodorow-Reich (2014)) it is clear that the value to firms of
having several established bank relationships is substantial. However, we know very
little about how additional bank relationships are established, save that the process
is relatively infrequent, and even less about how policy might influence this process.
We find that 24% of treated firms near the eligibility threshold have no debt with
the bank that gives them a guaranteed loan twelve months before, and a further 10%
have trivially small loans throughout the year preceding the FOGAPE loan. Thus,
around a third of the FOGAPE loans in our sample are used to establish an entirely
new, or to develop a fledgling banking relationship.
A natural concern in response to evidence of financial additionality is whether
CGS distort incentives for borrowers and lenders, which could increase default rates,
potentially becoming welfare reducing. The collapse of many CGS in the 1980s and
1990s due to unsustainable default rates makes clear that this is not a merely theo-
retical concern. Moreover, a recurring result in the extant literature on CGS is that
firms are more likely to default after participating in a CGS (for example, Lelarge
et al. (2010), and Uesugi et al. (2010)). In our RDD framework we find no evidence of
an increase in defaults relative to controls. Moreover, modifying our RDD to include
only firms that received a new loan in the same month (on both sides of the threshold)
we also find no evidence of additional defaults . Finally, when we look far from the
threshold at the smallest firms receiving FOGAPE we find statistically significant but
economically unimportant evidence that firms are more likely to default on the bank
that gave them FOGAPE rather than on their other bank(s).
FOGAPE has been financially sustainable over time and is often described in
detail in policy reviews of CGS, in particular due its innovative auction mechanism
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for assigning guarantee funds to banks. This makes it well-suited for study because
its relatively simple structure means it can be readily implemented elsewhere, and
because several other countries’ schemes are of similar design. This means that the
results we report for FOGAPE are of direct relevance to OECD countries given their
enduring interest in expanding credit to small business, the relatively large SMEs
studied (firms with sales of approximately 1 million US dollars) and because Chile’s
high degree of financial development makes comparisons with developed economies
appropriate.
In conclusion, we show clear causal evidence of the effectiveness of a CGS: financial
additionality along with the development of new banking relationships. Banerjee &
Duflo (2014) find causal evidence of firm financial constraints for firms with sales
of around 650,000 US dollars, in India, a substantially poorer and less financially
developed country. We also find significant financial constraints for firms with sales
of around 1m USD, in Chile, a middle income country with a well-developed financial
system. This congruence of well identified evidence using micro-data suggests that
firm credit constraints are widespread and associated with intrinsic features of SMEs
rather with characteristics of the financial system.
3.2 Credit Guarantee Schemes
3.2.1 The Logic of Credit Guarantee Schemes
A natural starting point in the evaluation of a CGS is to consider why such a scheme
might be justified –why might positive NPV loans remain un-funded in the absence
of a government guarantee? There is extensive theoretical work on why small firms
are particularly affected by credit constraints. The most immediate answer is the
existence of especially acute asymmetry of information between banks and small firms.
For example, in Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) the high baseline risk of SME borrowers,
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together with information asymmetry means that banks cannot adjust their interest
rates upwards to fully compensate, and credit rationing is likely to occur in response
to adverse selection and moral hazard. Furthermore, non-contractible effort or non-
verifiable income on the firm’s side could lead to credit constraints in the forms of
firms rationed out of the market or firms not being able to borrow as much as they
want even at a rate higher than the market interest rate. Tirole (2006) presents
several models of agency costs that lead to credit constraints.
Lending relationships (Rajan (1992); Petersen & Rajan (1994); Berger & Udell
(1995)) mitigate information asymmetry over time by developing soft information
(Stein (2002)) through learning about fixed dimensions of borrower quality (Botsch
& Vanasco (2015)). While relationships reduce the degree of credit rationing, they
are unlikely to fully resolve the problem: relationship lending is still relatively costly,
and the cost of post-loan monitoring is raised by the opacity of small borrowers. Of
course, relationship lending is not a solution for new loan applicants.
By contrast, the posting of collateral can provide an escape from credit rationing
by: (i) reducing the bank’s need to perform exhaustive credit analysis; (ii) screen-
ing out bad projects because only high NPV borrowers are willing to provide good
collateral; (iii) increasing effort and reducing ex post strategic default by making
default more costly for the borrower. As a result, a second reason why small firms
may be credit constrained is that some firms do not have sufficient collateral due to
wealth constraints, or the intangibility of their assets. Even firms with substantial
collateral may find themselves to be credit rationed if the institutions of collateral
process (registration, enforcement, contracts, bankruptcy) work poorly, or if the cost
of immobilizing collateral is high.
A third source of small firm credit constraints is that the transactions cost of
lending to SMEs is high relative to the size of their loans, and largely fixed. This
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makes for a low profit margin in comparison to larger borrowers; the smaller the
prospective loan size, the higher the likelihood that this will result in denial of credit,
ceteris paribus. Transactions costs are high in lending to new borrowers because the
information available to banks is limited, often of low quality, scarce (in the case of
young firms), or costly to process due to the wide heterogeneity that exists across
SME businesses, which makes automation difficult. Moreover, the cost of evaluating
a potential borrower is largely fixed because it largely consists of specialized loan
officer time.
Credit guarantee schemes are a potential solution to some – but not all – of
these inefficient small firm credit constraints. Because CGS in general do not have
additional information about borrowers, they do not reduce information asymmetry
problems, and may increase them, as discussed below. However, CGS do serve to
extend credit to firms denied credit because they lack collateral, or because collateral
institutions function poorly, by serving as a substitute for firm collateral. In this
context, CGS can reduce agency costs between firms and banks in the same way an
increase in the firms’ pledgeable assets would do it, leading to a decrease in interest
rates and to an increase in amount borrowed . Furthermore, CGS are likely to reduce
the impact of high and fixed transactions costs of lending to SMEs by reducing the
risk to the lender, and so increasing expected profit. Given that the asymmetric
information, transactions cost and limited collateral problems are more severe for
young firms – as they generally start small – and young firms are important for
innovation and productivity (Haltiwanger et al. (2012)), the social cost of credit
rationing the youngest and smallest firms may be especially high.
However, CGS are not a panacea: it is an empirical question as to whether such
schemes are welfare improving because their costs may outweigh their benefits, and
it is even unclear whether they are effective at all in meaningfully expanding lending.
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Government programs involve deadweight losses and potential agency problems due
to political influence on lending (e.g. Khwaja & Mian (2005); Zia (2008); Banerjee
& Duflo (2014)). More directly, CGS may lead to riskier lending than average by
exacerbating adverse selection and moral hazard problems, for example by directing
lending towards firms without positive NPV projects by encouraging excessive entry
(De Meza (2002)), or by reducing banks’ incentives to screen (Gropp et al. (2014)).
Furthermore, CGS could be used to shift bad loans to the Government’s balance sheet
– unsustainable default rates were a feature of many CGS in the 1980s and 1990s.
Alternatively, guaranteed loans may be assigned to firms that are unconstrained, and
that would have received loans in any case, resulting in rents for banks or firms, and
no financial additionality – the basic aim of such schemes. Thus, whether and how
CGS work is an empirical question.
CGS are often temporarily enhanced in response to periods of macroeconomic or
financial stress OECD (2013). Strong evidence exists that SMEs are disproportion-
ately affected by changes in macroeconomic variables such as monetary policy and
the business cycle Gertler & Gilchrist (1994), and particularly by credit crunches (
Khwaja & Mian (2008); Fort et al. (2013); Iyer et al. (2014), Deyoung et al. (2015)),
making CGS more likely to be effective (and welfare enhancing) in such periods.
This paper examines the effectiveness of a CGS in the absence of such stresses, which
provides a sterner test of their value.
3.2.2 Related Literature
Many studies examine the impacts of credit guarantee schemes, because of the very
large number of existing credit guarantee schemes Beck et al. (2010). Unfortunately,
estimating the causal impact of CGSs on firms is very difficult, because firms that
receive a guaranteed loan are not randomly selected from the population. For ex-
ample, the scheme may be more attractive to certain types of firms (for example,
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unprofitable or risky or politically unconnected), leading to applicant self-selection.
Further, the bank or guarantee agency often has incentives to apply the guarantee
to firms with characteristics unobservable to the econometrician, leading to selection
by the guarantee distributor. The interaction of these two dimensions of selection
is complex. Thus, the firms that receive guaranteed loans differ from the remaining
firms along an unknown number of dimensions, making the construction of an appro-
priate counterfactual group extremely difficult. This challenge has meant that there
is surprisingly little evidence based on a robust identification strategy and firm-level
data regarding the most basic feature of such schemes – financial additionality – and
there is still less on the real effects of CGS on borrowers. As Gozzi & Schmukler
(2015) note in an overview of the design and evidence on CGS: rigorous evidence on
the impact of these schemes is still scarce.
Lelarge et al. (2010) provide perhaps the strongest evidence to date of the effects
of a CGS by exploiting the new eligibility of certain industries to the French CGS
in a difference in difference framework paired with a selection model. Our study
differs from theirs in two key respects: the plausibly exogenous variation they exploit
is industry-level, whereas we exploit firm-level variation, allowing for greater power,
and their CGS is for newly established firms only, whereas there is no constraint on
the ages of the firms we examine, and they are on average 11 years old. They find
evidence of financial additionality, and higher ex post firm growth rates, as well as
higher ex post bankruptcy rates for treated firms.
Lelarge et al. (2010) are not the only study to show unintended consequences of
CGS. Uesugi et al. (2010), using a matching estimator that relies on the assumption
that all selection is controlled for by variables they observe, show alarming evidence
of Japan’s CGS being used to shift bad loans on to the books of the government.
Different but also clearly welfare-reducing effects are reported by Zia (2008) in the
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context of subsidized export credit in Pakistan, where nearly half of the subsidized
loans went to financially unconstrained firms.
A closely related paper is Cowan et al. (2015), which study delinquency rates
in loans guaranteed by FOGAPE. They find that FOGAPE clients default more
than non-FOGAPE firms between 2003 and 2006, which, when taken together with
the finding that they were not more likely to default on FOGAPE loans than non-
FOGAPE loans suggests that they are lower quality borrowers (negatively selected).
Cowan and co-authors also use bank-level variation in access to guarantees to estimate
positive financial additionality at the aggregate level. Our study has access to much
more detailed data, and most importantly to exogenous variation at the firm level in a
regression discontinuity design, allowing us to examine the causal effects of FOGAPE
more directly, and to examine many more dimensions of the program’s effects at the
firm level.
We are also among the very few studies to rigorously show positive results from a
CGS, given that we do not find strong evidence of negative selection, or of additional
defaults. Perhaps most notably of among the few papers finding only positive effects,
Hancock et al. (2007) take a more macroeconomic perspective, and examine the effects
of SBA loans on state-level outcomes. They report that SBA loans were less pro-
cyclical and less affected by bank capital than non-guaranteed loans, suggesting a
stabilizing effect of the SBA on SME outcomes.
3.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.3.1 Data
This chapter uses the same data set as in Chapters 1 and 2, plus information from
the FOGAPE administrator. It links banking and tax information for the universe of
Chilean firms. The data are the administrative records from Chile’s Internal Revenue
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Service, Unemployment Insurance Administrator, and Bank Supervisory Authority.
These institutions use the information for their own auditing or supervisory activities,
which means that this is high quality data. Datasets are merged using a unique iden-
tifier equivalent to a social security number for both individuals (for unemployment
insurance) and firms. The panel covers the period 2007 to mid-2013.
Tax records from Chile’s IRS are both annual (the F22 income tax declaration
form) and monthly (the F29 value-added-tax declaration form), and cover all corpora-
tions in Chile. Unemployment insurance data are monthly, and identify the number
of workers at each firm, their wage, tenure and contract type. Unemployment in-
surance contributions are mandatory for all salaried workers in the private sector in
Chile, so our data covers the universe of employer-employee matches for salaried jobs
in the formal private sector. Banking data includes the universe of bank-firm pairs
and contains the stock of outstanding debt for each pair in each month, as well as
the debt’s non-payment status in several categories. Loan characteristics such as the
interest rate or maturity are unfortunately unavailable. Finally, the FOGAPE admin-
istrator directly provided to the IRS a variable (along with the appropriate identifier)
indicating which firms had received a guaranteed loan, the date they received it and
the granting bank.
3.3.2 Sample
We begin with the Chilean IRS’s definition of a firm: all corporations, and indi-
viduals if they pay the corporate income tax or are an employer of another person.
This very broad definition therefore includes many nonproductive “shell” firms and
single-worker firms. To deal with this, we drop all firms that do not have at least one
employee continuously – at the monthly frequency – for 12 months before and one
month after the focal period. This restriction drops many firms that appear inter-
mittently in the data and distort firm dynamics. We then drop all firms that had less
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than three employees on average in the twelve months before the focal period to avoid
results being driven by extremely small firms. In order to remove firms that are non-
participants in the banking system we also drop firms whose average total bank debt
during the six months before the focal month is less than 100 UFs, (approximately
4,000 USD). Finally, we drop all firms in the financial sector to avoid potential double
counting in the banking data, and firms in the Public Administration and Defense
sectors, which are not eligible for FOGAPE.
The sample period is January 2011 to December 2012 inclusive. We begin in Jan-
uary 2011 and not before because FOGAPE’s funding and rules changed substantially
in the 2009-2010 period, making it unrepresentative of the scheme’s normal opera-
tions, to which it returned in January 2011. We also focus the sample around the
sales cutoff in eligibility for FOGAPE, as detailed in the next section.
3.3.3 Eligibility Rule
For a firm to be eligible for FOGAPE credit guarantees the sum of its sales over the
preceding twelve calendar months must not exceed 25,000 UF (approximately US 1
million), and it must be a borrower of “normal” risk according to the bank’s internal
rating, which in practice appears to be a requirement that the borrower be current
on its obligations to the bank. Sales are determined by a complex formula that is not
public: banks (not customers) can query whether a potential customer is FOGAPE-
eligible or not on a given day via a private web system that checks against an IRS
database, but they do not see the value of the rolling twelve month sum, only the
eligible/ineligible indicator. Moreover, the database is of monthly VAT declaration
forms that are uploaded with approximately a three month lag into the web-query
system.
The opacity of the sales formula, and the lag in updating the database, makes it
hard for firms in the vicinity of the 25,000 UF eligibility threshold to anticipate on
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which side of the cutoff they will be at any given point in time. This opacity and
uncertainty will be of value for the empirical strategy, as will be discussed in the
following section.
Finally, two details of how FOGAPE operates are worth mentioning here. Firstly,
in our period the guarantee rate, while set in a competitive auction, was very close to
the maximum of 80%. Secondly, banks – not firms or FOGAPE itself – decide which
firms receive a loan guarantee. For more details regarding how FOGAPE works we
refer the reader to Cowan et al. (2015).
3.3.4 Empirical Strategy
We estimate the causal effect of credit guarantees on firm outcomes using a regression
discontinuity design (RDD). The intuition behind the RDD is as follows. Firms in
a narrow bandwidth around the eligibility threshold are quasi-randomly assigned to
be on either side of the 25,000 UF sales threshold of eligibility in any given month,
because they do not know the value of the sales that the Chilean IRS is using to
compute their eligibility status. In particular, the formula for sales is complex (not
a simple sum of total VAT-eligible sales), non-public, and the data underlying its
value is updated with a lag of approximately three months. In the language of the
RDD, the assignment variable (the IRS’s twelve month sum of sales) is not visible
to the firms or to the banks (which is unusual in a RDD), but is available to the
econometrician.
This means that firms on one side of the cutoff are well suited to be controls for
firms on the other side, because the only dimension along which they differ system-
atically is in their IRS sales measure, which in turn determines whether or not firms
are eligible for FOGAPE, and so can receive treatment. Importantly, there are no
other public programs in Chile whose benefits or participation vary discontinuously
at 25,000 UF, which would imply the existence of ”other treatments” at the thresh-
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old. The difference in outcome variables between eligible (sales below 25,000) and
ineligible firms (sales above 25,000) is what the RDD estimator measures.
The RDD’s suitability for causal inference derives from the relatively mild as-
sumptions it requires. RDDs rely on the assumption that, except for participation
in the program, the distributions of both observable and unobservable characteristics
of individuals are continuous at the threshold (Lee & Lemieux (2010)). In practice,
this implies that companies cannot precisely control their IRS sales value, and thus
cannot choose to be eligible for FOGAPE with certainty. This assumption implies
that, in the absence of the eligibility threshold the outcomes of firms just below the
cutoff and those above would have been similar, so the only reason that the actual
outcomes are different is that some firms below the threshold are assigned FOGAPE
guaranteed loans.
While it is true that firms could reduce their sales to such an extent that they could
be certain to be eligible, this would be costly to the firm, given the uncertainty they
face with regards to how far away they are from the threshold. Alternatively, the firm
could attempt to delay the tax reporting of the sales. However, these sales are subject
to value added tax (VAT), which has a built-in incentive structure that generates a
third-party reported paper trail that facilitates tax enforcement, so delayed reporting
would require active cooperation from the firm’s customers if they are firms themselves
(for evidence that Chile’s VAT enforcement is strong, see Pomeranz (2015)). In any
case, whether firms are manipulating their reported sales is explicitly testable in our
data by examining the density of observations on either side of the threshold using
the McCrary (2008) test, as described below, and also by comparing the time paths
of monthly sales of firms receiving loan guarantees with those of firms receiving loans
without guarantees – they are identical, suggesting no manipulation.
The assumption of imprecise control over firms’ IRS sales implies firms are as
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if randomly assigned to treatment in the proximity of the eligibility threshold for
FOGAPE. This assumption has three main testable implications: 1) Observed pre-
determined characteristics should be similar on either side of the sales threshold; 2)
the density of firms on either side of the threshold should be the same; 3) RDD
estimates estimate should not vary materially when we include baseline covariates, as
these are not required for consistent estimation of the treatment effect. We provide
evidence for the first two in the following section, and for implication three in the
results section.
The first and most intuitive specification we estimate is the reduced form com-
parison of all firms in the bandwidth below the cutoff, with all such firms above the
cutoff. This is an unbiased estimator of the average effect of being eligible for FO-
GAPE – not necessarily receiving treatment – in the region around the threshold. We
pool all firm-month observations, including year-month fixed effects, and estimate the
following regression:
Outcomeit = C + ρEligibleit + γ1Salesit + γ2EligibleXSalesit + δt + it (3.1)
Where i indexes firms, and t indexes months. Eligible is an indicator equal to
one if the firm’s IRS sales are below 25,000 UF. Sales is our observed firm IRS sales
value for that month – the assignment variable – minus 25,000 to center the data on
the cutoff. The above specification is estimated on a range of different bandwidths,
with 1500 UF to either side of the cutoff as the preferred bandwidth. We do this by
running a linear regression.
We then move to estimate the effect of actual treatment, as opposed to eligibility.
For this we estimate a Fuzzy RDD, (i.e. not sharp) for two reasons. Firstly and
most importantly, not all eligible firms are treated, as banks do not have unlimited
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guarantee funds and so must choose which firms to assign the guarantee to. Further-
more, a substantial fraction of firms above and below the eligibility threshold have
no demand for credit on any given month, which materially reduces the frequency of
treatment (above and below the threshold). Figure 3·1 presents the local averages of
treatment probability around the cutoff. Secondly, some treated firms appear to have
sales above the threshold, which would make them ineligible. After extensive conver-
sations with officials managing FOGAPE, we are certain this is due to measurement
error. In particular, the lagged updating of the assignment variable (IRS sales) means
that we may be mis-assigning the sales value that was visible at the time on the web
query system to the month before or the month after treatment. Additionally, there
are a small number of exporters using FOGAPE that are not subject to the 25,000
UF cutoff, but that appear in our data as recipients of treatment, when in reality
the treatment they received was different. Fuzzy RDD resolves this by using the
observed value of the assignment variable to generate an eligibility indicator, which
is then used as an instrument for actual receipt of treatment, which is endogenously
determined by banks in this case. Importantly, following Angrist et al. (1996), the
estimates from the fuzzy RDD are to be interpreted as a local average treatment
effect (LATE), that is, the effect of getting a guarantee for the subpopulation of firms
that get the guarantee only when they are eligible for the program (compliers).
We implement the fuzzy RDD following the standard procedure using instrumental
variable estimation. As before, we pool all firm-month observations, including year-
month fixed effects, and estimate a two-stage least squares regression where eligibility
is used as an instrument for treatment:
Outcomeit = C + β ˆTreatment+ φ1Salesit + φ2 ˆTreatmentXSalesit + ηt + νit
(3.2)
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Where i indexes firms, and t indexes months. Treatment is an indicator equal
to one if the firm receives a guaranteed loan. The specification is estimated on a
relatively small bandwidth of 1500 UF to either side of the cutoff – approximately
6% of annual sales for the average firm in the bandwidth, and corresponds to local
linear regression fuzzy RDD.
Using a wider bandwidth provides additional statistical power at the cost of in-
troducing greater bias because the RDD’s randomization result is local: as one moves
away from the cutoff it becomes increasingly less true that the firms on either side are
similar ex ante. An alternative is to use a wider bandwidth and to control for increas-
ing heterogeneity across the boundary using a flexible polynomial function. However,
in their benchmarking of the RDD against experimental data, Black et al. (2007) re-
port that local linear regressions have lower bias and less specification-sensitivity than
polynomial regressions. Accordingly, the local linear regression above is the preferred
specification throughout. The bandwidth choice of 1500 UF of sales (approximately
US 60,000) on either side was chosen for simplicity and comparability of the sample
across estimates, but we show estimates are generally robust to both smaller and
larger bandwidths (as well as polynomial functions with larger bandwidths).
The above specification includes month fixed effects. While fixed effects (of any
type) are not required for consistent inference in the RDD, they mitigate concerns
that certain months may be different from other. In robustness checks, we show that
we obtain similar results if we include a variety of covariates, or if we remove the
controls for the assignment variable, and instead control non-parametrically for the
assignment variable by making the bandwidth extremely small (e.g. 500 UF or 750
UF). It is worth recalling, however, that a valid RDD with a local linear specification
and a small bandwidth – our main specification – does not require the inclusion of
covariates beyond the assignment variable for identification or consistency, and is not
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subject to omitted variable biases.
3.3.5 Tests for Quasi-Randomized Assignment
Our identification strategy relies on random assignment to the “treatment” (i.e. FO-
GAPE eligibility). As mentioned in the previous section, this assumption has testable
implications, akin to the tests of effective randomization in experimental data.
The first testable implication is that the distribution of the assignment variable
should not exhibit any bunching around the discontinuity, as this constitutes prima
facie evidence that firms can manipulate their value of the assignment variable, sug-
gesting a violation of the key assumption of imprecise control. Figures 3·2 and 3·3 do
not provide evidence of bunching. Furthermore, we perform the McCrary (2008) test
for discontinuities in the density of the assignment variable: IRS sales.
Given our empirical design where we observe the same eligibility experiment re-
peated every month, this test is run for every month from 2011 to 2012. Table 3.1
shows that the average monthly t statistic for the McCrary test of discontinuity in
the density around the eligibility threshold for a bandwidth of 10,000 UF at each side
is -1.09. For a larger bandwidth with values of the running variables ranging from
20,000 UF to 45,000 UF it is -1.1; none are statistically significantly different from
zero at any conventional level. In short we are unable to reject the null of continu-
ity of the density function around the eligibility threshold, suggesting firms are not
manipulating their reported sales in order to become eligible for the program.
The second testable implication is that firms to the left and to the right of the
cutoff should be similar on the basis of ex ante characteristics. If they differ, then
the treatment would not appear to be randomized and we would infer that compa-
nies are able to predict their eligibility and sort themselves accordingly. In Table 3.2
we present summary statistics for a series of covariates in the baseline period imme-
diately preceding reconstitution. The difference-in-means test provided in the last
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column of each summary statistics table confirms that the average difference in each
characteristic across the bandwidth is statistically insignificant.
A third implication of random assignment to treatment is the relative invariability
of estimates to the inclusion of baseline values of covariates and fixed effects. If the
RDD is valid, covariates beyond the assignment variable (and functions thereof) are
not required for identification or consistency, and serve simply to reduce sampling
variability, especially with a local linear specification in a narrow bandwidth. Thus
they should not change the value of the coefficient materially on average, although
some fixed effects could reduce the available variation to such an extent that little
remains for estimation. In the results section we show this is the case for the main
results of the paper by including a battery of control variables. In unreported results
we re-estimate the RDD for a number of placebo thresholds instead of 25,000 UF in
sales; no discrete jumps are observed.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Additionality
Panels A and B in Table 3.3 show the causal effect of FOGAPE on the change in firms’
total debt. We use the Davis et al. (2006) growth measure, using as the base period
the average of six months before the focal period, t. This growth measure divides the
difference between the future period t+x and the base period by the average of the two
periods, and is especially well-suited to dealing with large heterogeneity, as it bounds
growth between -2 (exit) and 2 (entry)1. We also show results using the traditional
definition of the growth rate and obtain statistically significant but somewhat larger
estimates; the difference is driven by firms having very low debt either the following
month or the month before, resulting in a very low divisor, and consequently a very
1In order to have a smooth measure of debt’s growth rate, we consider the average of t-6 to t-1
as the base period.
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high rate of change. The Davis et al. measure is much less affected by these outliers
and as a result is preferable in our view.
Recall that the main specification has a bandwidth of 1500 UF around the thresh-
old (approximately US 6,000 of 12 month sales, relative to a total of US 1 million)
and runs a local linear regression. The reduced form estimates of Table 3.3 show
that debt for eligible firms grows 2.6% on average in the focal period with respect to
ineligible firms in the bandwidth. That is, there is an average 2.6% increase in one
month, causally attributable to being eligible for FOGAPE. The IV estimate that
measures the causal effect of actually receiving a guarantee on the subpopulation of
complier firms shows much bigger effects. On average, treated firms increase their
total debt by almost 97% at the moment of receiving the guarantee with respect to
untreated firms in the bandwidth. This number is around two standard deviations of
the monthly growth in debt at the firm level at any point in time. Importantly, these
estimates are robust to a variety of different specifications, providing support for the
validity of the RDD. In particular, including firm level controls such as number of
workers, industry, age and a lender fixed effect, does not have a material effect on the
estimates, which supports the local exogeneity of the eligibility rule. Furthermore,
we run a specification without the assignment variable - no assignment column - in a
smaller bandwidth to rule out that results are driven by the correlation of debt growth
with the assignment variable and find similar results. The use of a triangle kernel
– in unreported results – does not change the estimates either. Finally, results are
consistent with local linear regressions on smaller and larger bandwidths of 1,250 and
1,750 UFs; and with a bigger bandwidth of 4,000 UF using a third degree polynomial
of the assignment variable.
To study the persistence of the effects of FOGAPE, we run regressions for leads
of the dependent variable. Panels A and B in Table 3.4 show the cumulative effect
85
on debt growth over time. Here, the estimate on the lead six months after the focal
period should be interpreted as the cumulative growth in the firm’s total debt over
six months. Given the term structure of the average loan with principal repayments
during the life of the loan, we expected to find a persistent but diminishing differential
effect of Fogape over time. However, as shown by both reduced and IV estimates,
the effect increases over the first year, reaching a peak at around twelve months after
the focal period. When we examine, in our RDD setup, the growth in debt excluding
debt held by treated firms at the bank that gave them the FOGAPE guarantee (but
retaining their debt at other banks) we find that the debt of treated firms at banks
that did not extend FOGAPE to them increases also. In fact, the effects of the
program on other banks’ debt are statistically significant after twelve months (see
Table 3.5).
This increase in debt at banks that are not extending the guarantee to treated
firms suggests that the guarantee frees up some of the firm’s existing collateral, which
can be used to raise funds at other institutions. Informal conversations with officers
in the Chilean banking industry and the administrators of Fogape suggest that this
is likely. Unfortunately, we do not observe the amount of collateral pledged by firms,
and therefore cannot directly test this hypothesis.
Nevertheless, the fact that the effect grows during the first year after the focal
period has two important implications. Firstly, the effect of the program on firms’
debt capacity goes beyond the amount of the guarantee, leading to a multiplier effect
on firms’ access to credit. In turn, this means that any attempt to measure the effects
of CGSs should evaluate the impact on total borrowing, rather than just on single
loans.
Second and more importantly, this results suggests that treated firms are indeed
credit constrained. Following the logic in Banerjee & Duflo (2014), if after receiving
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FOGAPE firms are willing to accept higher rates from other institutions and increase
borrowing, this implies that in fact firms are credit constrained because they want to
borrow more at the highest offered rate – in other words, additionality of FOGAPE
cannot only be explained by a potentially lower interest rate on the guaranteed loan
due to a subsidy component. This result has implications for the effectiveness of
the program, as it shows that it is actually reducing credit constraints rather than
redistributing or increasing the debt of unconstrained firms.
3.4.2 FOGAPE and New Lending Relationships
CGSs can have non-monetary benefits that go beyond the relief of credit constraints
due to lack of collateral. One important such benefit, virtually ignored by the litera-
ture on CGSs, is their potential ability to incentivize the development of new bank-
ing relationships for less transparent firms. In this section we present novel evidence
showing that FOGAPE helps SMEs to form and develop new banking relationships.
There is a large literature on the benefits of relationship banking. At the firm
level, empirical studies like Petersen & Rajan (1994, 1995) and Berger & Udell (1995)
show that longer banking relationships improve access to credit for bank-dependent
firms. At the macro level a well-established literature shows how sticky banking
relationships are key to the transmission of both positive and negative bank-level
shocks to firms2. The fact that banks’ health may have a direct and economically
important effect on their clients highlights the value to firms of having several banking
relationships, particularly in times of aggregate financial distress.
Borrowers and lenders form relationships to overcome inefficiencies caused by
asymmetric information. Through a relationship the lender develops private informa-
2For negative banking shocks the literature is extense: Peek & Rosengren (2000); Khwaja & Mian
(2008); Paravisini (2008); Iyer & Peydro´ (2011); Schnabl (2012); Chodorow-Reich (2014). In the
Chapter 1, using the same data set for Chilean firms I find that a positive bank-level shock during
the 2008-09 crisis has a temporary financial effect at the firm level, which in turns translates into
persistent real effects in the medium run.
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tion not available to the market (Stein (2002)), which reduces the lender’s expected
cost of providing capital. However, this learning process entails a risk to the lender,
which can be reduced by a guarantee. In the case of FOGAPE, given that banks can
assign them without many constraints, the question is what types of risk the bank
would prefer to reduce. In this context, banks may find more profitable to assign
guarantees to resolve the uncertainty about the type of potential clients, rather than
bounding potential losses of risky projects of known clients. Because banks are usu-
ally not allowed to hold equity, there is limited upside in financing risky projects;
however, the potential value of new “good” clients is high, as the bank can extract
rents from several loans over time3.
Figure 3·7 shows the frequency of FOGAPE guarantees as a function of the length
of the banking relationship between the bank assigning the guarantee and the firm
receiving it. The histogram is constructed using the all guarantees from 2007 to
2013. It shows that almost 15% of the guarantees are assigned to firms that do not
have a relationship with the lender, that is, to firms completely new to the bank4.
Furthermore, around a third of this fraction corresponds to firms that are completely
new to the banking system – Figure 3·8 – which suggests that the effect is larger on
firms with fewer banking relationships. Including the first six months of a relationship,
a time frame where the uncertainty about the firm’s quality is arguably entirely un-
resolved, the fraction of guarantees assigned to new clients goes up to almost 25%.
These figures suggests that indeed guarantees are often used by banks and firms to
3This argument assumes that the lender has some market power, which is consistent with the
empirical evidence on sticky banking relationships. In fact, acquiring information not available to
the market provides the lender with this market power and the ability to extract future rents from
the firm. For a discussion of the effects of bank competition on SME’s access to credit see Petersen
& Rajan (1995).
4We observe every firm-bank pair in Chile from 2005 to 2013, so our data set allows us to measure
the length of banking relationships from 2005. Since for all figures with the complete sample of
FOGAPE loans we are using data between 2007 and 2013, a firm is considered new to the system if
it did not get any loans throughout 2005 and 2006.
88
form new relationships.
We then run several RDD regressions examining a firm’s number of banking re-
lationships at the eligibility threshold. Since firms around the eligibility threshold
are relatively well established, with an average (and median) of two relationships,
the effect of the program on the formation of new relationships is likely to be lower
than it is for smaller and less established firms. Thus, we run these regressions for
the subsample of firms that have a single banking relationship six months before the
focal month - there are no effects on the total number of bank relationships for firms
with two or more banks in the period before the focal month. Panels A and B in Ta-
ble 3.6 shows the results of these regressions for the reduced form RDD specification
and the Fuzzy RDD specification respectively. The program has an economically and
statistically significant impact on the formation of new relationships.
We focus on economically meaningful bank relationships, by which we mean banks
with which the firm has at least 20% of its total debt. The reduced form estimates
show that eligibility for program has a causal effect of generating .02 new bank rela-
tionships by the month after the focal month (the one month delay is a result of how
we calculate the bank relationships), while this effect peaks at six months, with an
estimate of .04 new bank relationships; coefficients for before the focal month are not
statistically distinguishable from zero. Panel B shows the estimates for compliers.
The effects of eligibility for the program are statistically and economically important:
the estimates imply that at the moment of receiving the guarantee, compliers increase
their number of bank relationships by one bank around the FOGAPE month, and by
an additional bank by six months after the focal month. The second bank relationship
must be coming from a bank that is not using FOGAPE with this firm, which is also
consistent with idea that FOGAPE frees up a fraction of the firm’s collateral, which
can be used to borrow from other lenders as well.
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3.4.3 The Cost of FOGAPE
A major concern with credit guarantee schemes is that they may increase default
rates, as has been reported by some existing papers (for example Lelarge et al. (2010),
Uesugi et al. (2010)). In the case of FOGAPE, its explicit requirement that firms
be of at least “normal” risk according to the bank’s internal rating, and a rule that
reduces future allocation of guarantees if the bank’s default rate is too high seem to
prevent the phenomenon documented for Japan by Uesugi et al. (2010): shifting of
firms about to default into the CGS. Nevertheless, partial credit guarantees can have
an effect on the types of firms and projects that get funded – a selection effect –
and may also distort incentives at the bank and the firm level that affect repayment
behavior- moral hazard. On the one hand, banks could choose to assign the guarantee
to projects more costly to monitor (relative to the amount of the loan), which would
in turn decrease monitoring efforts by the bank and increase default rates. On the
other hand, once assigned a guarantee, firms with more than one banking relationship
could selectively choose to default on lenders with insured loans if defaulting on those
lenders is relatively less costly. This could occur if, on average, relationships with
lenders that provide guarantees are less developed from the firm’s perspective. On
the firm’s side, if FOGAPE frees up collateral that is then used to borrow from other
banks, as the evidence suggests, then the firm has an incentive to default first on
loans backed by FOGAPE, reducing the risk of losing its own collateral.
Cowan et al. (2015) address the question of incentive distortions caused by FO-
GAPE. They find that FOGAPE indeed distorts incentives for the borrower. Com-
paring delinquency rates for different loans to the same firm from the same lender
by using firm-bank-time fixed effects, they find that repayment rates are lower for
guaranteed loans versus non-guaranteed loans, which shows that the program has a
distorting effect on the firms’ incentives. Although they are no able to use the same
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specification with firm-bank-time fixed effects when trying to measure the effects on
default rates 5, they present evidence suggesting that default rates are not affected
by the program.
Using the identification provided by the eligibility rule and data on repayment
behavior by treated firms, in this section we extend and complement the analysis
in Cowan et al. (2015). We use three measures of default. First, we measure the
probability that at least one loan becomes non-performing (that is, at least ninety
days overdue for payment) at the firm level, conditional on the firm having no non-
performing loans in the previous period. This measure is intended to capture the
extent to which firms selectively choose to default on guaranteed loans. We also use
two more standard measures to capture the default rate on loans. The second one
is the frequency of having at least one non-performing loan at the firm level at any
point in time, and the third one is the fraction of the amount of non-performing loans
over the firm’s total debt.
We start by comparing repayment behavior for firms that are eligible for FOGAPE
versus the repayment behavior of ineligible firms around the 25.000 UF threshold.
Panel A in Table 3.7 shows the reduced form estimates on repayment behavior six
months before eligibility, and twelve and eighteen months after eligibility. The fact
that estimates of the program’s effect on all three measures are not statistically dif-
ferent from zero at a 95% confidence level six months before, supports the assumption
of an exogenous eligibility threshold. The estimates for twelve and eighteen months
for the three measures of repayment behavior are not statistically significant either,
which suggests that the program does not have a positive (or negative) effect on
default rates for firms around the threshold. However, this result could be driven
by the particular composition of subpopulations around the threshold. For example,
5A fraction of a loan is considered delinquent if a payment on its principal is overdue by more
than sixty days and less than ninety days. A fraction of loan is considered non-performing or on
default if payments are overdue by more than ninety days.
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the existence of a large fraction of firms that never receive FOGAPE – never takers
– because their probability of defaulting on a loan is very low, which is known by
the bank, would dilute any potential positive effect on other subpopulations such as
compliers.
Panel B in Table 3.7 also shows the Fuzzy RDD estimates for the same regressions,
and therefore the causal effect on the subpopulation of compliers; these estimates
support the idea that the program has no causal effect on default rates. Nevertheless,
these numbers have to be interpreted carefully, as the standard errors are large, and
so the 95% confidence intervals do not rule out potentially large delinquency effects.
To further explore the effects of FOGAPE on repayment behavior we adopt a
complimentary approach, similar in spirit to the “within borrower” specification in
Cowan et al. (2015). We ask if, conditional on getting a guarantee and having more
than one lender, firms default more frequently on guaranteed loans. To answer this
question we run the following specification on firm-bank pairs from 2005 to 2013 at
the monthly frequency:
Outcomeibt = C + γ1fog24ibt + γ2Rel.Lengthibt + γ3Rel.Relevance+ δit + ibt
(3.3)
Where i denotes firm, b bank and t time. The dependent variables are the two
measures of default frequency. We run each regression on the subpopulation of firms
that have at least two bank relationships and received at least one loan guaranteed by
FOGAPE in the previous twenty four months6. We include firm-month fixed effects,
which means that identification of the effect of FOGAPE comes from firms choosing
6We observe the firm and lender pair when a new loan is assigned the guarantee. Unfortunately
we do not observe the maturity or other characteristics of the loan, and therefore we do not observe
if an outstanding loan has the guarantee. A twenty four month time frame provides an upper bound
on the effect, as the average FOGAPE loan has a maturity of 16 months.
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to default differentially between those lenders that assigned a guarantee to the firm
and the rest. In other words, estimates on fog24 are not explained by either time
varying firm-specific characteristics, such as demand shocks, or static characteristics,
such as economic activity.
An important difference with the “within firm” approach in Cowan et al. (2015) is
that we observe a much longer panel for the universe of firm-bank pairs in Chile, which
allows us to include relevant controls at the firm-bank level7. Therefore, to capture
the effect of characteristics specific to the firm-bank relationship on default we control
for the length of the relationship (months since the first loan from that bank) and
a measure of how important the bank is to the firm (measured in months from the
first time the firm got a loan from that bank). A priori, our other findings suggest
that controlling for these two characteristics is particularly important as FOGAPE
is partially used by banks to attract new clients, and to increase participation at
the firm level when the bank is not the main lender. In general, these two controls
together should capture the depth of the lending relationship.
Estimates on fog24 from equation (3.3) do not, strictly, provide a causal inter-
pretation of the effect of the program on repayment behavior, because unobservable
characteristics of the firm-bank relationship could also determine the assignment of
a guarantee. However, the inclusion of firm-time fixed effects and firm-bank rela-
tionship controls greatly reduces the set of potential explanations for our finding. In
short, it seems very likely that whatever we find is causally attributable to incen-
tive distortions caused by the program at the bank level. Importantly, although not
directly comparable with the estimates from the Fuzzy RDD, estimates from these
regressions provide an alternative idea of the effect of the program on default rates for
firms around the eligibility threshold. Additionally, we obtain estimates away from
7Additionally, Cowan et al. (2015) look mainly at delinquency rates rather than default rates.
A fraction of a loan is considered on delinquent status when its payment is overdue, while it is
considered on default or non-performing when its payment is overdue by more than ninety days.
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the threshold, and can compare average default rates for firms of different size.
Table 3.8 shows the estimates from these regressions. Results are consistent for the
two measures of repayment behavior. Column (1) in Panel A shows that the average
probability of becoming non-performing is approximately 0.57% for non-FOGAPE
banks and 0.6% for fogape banks, therefore 4.6% higher for FOGAPE banks. Column
(1) in Panel B shows that, on average, 2.2% of non-FOGAPE banks have at least
one non-performing loan at any point in time, and that this probability increases by
almost 10% on FOGAPE banks. The lower than on average default rates in both
panels (6%) is explained by the particular characteristics of our subsample: firms
with more than one banking relationship that have received a guaranteed loan in the
past twenty four months.
In Panels A and B, Column (2) shows a positive and statistically significant cor-
relation between program participation and the frequency of non-performing loans.
The numbers show that the probability of becoming non-performing is 14% higher for
FOGAPE bank-firm pairs (Panel A), and that the fraction of non-performing loans
is higher for these pairs (Panel B).
Columns (3) to (6) for Panels A and B show results for the same specification
run on firms with different levels of the assignment variable in the Fuzzy RDD –
cumulative sales in the past twelve months. For both measures of repayment behavior,
the higher fraction of non-performing loans for FOGAPE banks is explained by firms
far above the 25,000 UF threshold – Column (3) in both panels- and smaller firms
– Column (6) in both panels. Firms above the threshold were eligible for FOGAPE
throughout 2009-2010, as part of the policy response to the global financial crisis;
their repayment behavior may be very different to the normal FOGAPE recipient, and
may also reflect the financial stress of the crisis period. The fact that delinquency for
FOGAPE firm-banks rises and the difference becomes significant as we move towards
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smaller firms may be evidence that the program reduces monitoring or collection
efforts by lenders for smaller loans, for which the likely fixed cost of these activities
is relatively larger.
Finally, column (4) in both panels shows no evidence of higher default rates at
banks that assign a guarantee versus other banks for firms around the eligibility
threshold. This result is consistent with the findings of the Fuzzy RDD.
3.5 Discussion
CGSs are ubiquitous across the world, and mobilize significant resources. Yet selection
challenges have meant that there is surprisingly little clean evidence on the causal
effects of these programs on firms’ access to credit, potential incentive distortions and
other dimensions relevant to assess the effectiveness and value of CGSs. Moreover,
CGSs provide a window into the effects of credit constraints on firms, especially if
the CGS is effective in alleviating them.
Using a comprehensive data set and a regression discontinuity design, we have
provided clear causal evidence of the effects of FOGAPE, Chile’s CGS program,
on firms’ borrowing, repayment behavior and its impact on the formation of new
bank relationships. Our results indicate that FOGAPE provides substantial financial
additionality. In fact, the program seems to boost overall debt capacity, as borrowing
increases not only at the lender assigning the guarantee, but at other banks as well.
A potential explanation for this phenomenon is that the guarantee frees up some of
the firm’s own collateral, which can be used to increase borrowing at other banks.
An additional and novel finding, to our knowledge, is that guarantees are used
by banks to develop new banking relationships, a costly process for firms and a risky
one for banks. In particular, FOGAPE is used to develop new bank relationships for
firms that, ex ante, had only a single existing bank relationship. This non-monetary
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benefit is potentially of greater value than the additional lending we document, given
the key role of bank health in periods of financial stress.
In terms of the efficiency of the program the fact that there is increased borrowing
from banks other than the one assigning a guarantee provides strong evidence that
FOGAPE is indeed helping firms that are credit constrained, as opposed to firms
that would have received credit in any case. That is, the program is serving its main
stated objective. On the other hand, we found evidence that firms default more on
loans with the guarantee than loans without, suggesting that the CGS introduces
some moral hazard. However, this seems to be true only at smaller firms.
Overall, the evidence shows that FOGAPE has an important role in the relief of
credit constraints for SMEs. Furthermore, since our study only considers a period
of boom in the Chilean business cycle (2011-2012), we believe that we are likely
estimating a lower bound of the true effects for SMEs. That is, the program has
a potentially large value as a countercyclical policy tool, particularly in times of
aggregate financial distress.
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Figure 3·1: Probability of treatment
Figure 3·2: Histogram of assignment variable 2011-2012
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Figure 3·3: Histogram of assignment variable (zoom) 2011-2012
Figure 3·4: Debt growth six months before the focal period
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Figure 3·5: Debt growth in the focal period
Figure 3·6: Debt growth six months after the focal period
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Figure 3·7: Histogram of treatment and relationship length
Figure 3·8: Histogram of treatment and time in the banking system
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Table 3.1: This table shows results for the McCrary (2008) test for discontinuities
in the density of firms’ sales around the eligibility threshold (25,000 UF). The null
hypothesis is continuity in the density. The test is run every month between 2011-
2012 (our sample period) for different bandwidths around the eligibility threshold:
L-limit is the lower bound, R-limit is the upper bound.
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Table 3.8: This table presents coefficients from regressions of frequencies of non-performing loans from banks granting
a guarantee versus from other banks, given that the firm received a guaranteed loan in the previous 24 months and
that the firm borrows from at least two banks. P(become default) is an indicator equal to one if at least one of
the firm’s loans becomes not performing, given that the firm had no non-performing loans in the previous period.
P(default) is similar, but not conditional on the firm having no non-performing loans in the previous period. A loan
is considered non-performing if a principal payment is overdue by more than three months. Bandwidth regressions
divide the sample into different categories depending on the firm’s annual sales, using the IRS’ FOGAPE measure.
Bank relationship controls are (i) number of months since the firm obtained its first loan from the bank, and (ii) the
fraction of debt with the bank over the firm’s total debt. All regressions are estimated by OLS with robust standard
errors.
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